Marine Corps Gazette

SEPT 1959
•
FORTY CENTS



LAST CHANCE!

Contest Essays must be in by 1 October

$2,000

CLASSIFICATIONS

Group I: Field Grade Officers; Civilians
Group II: Company Grade Officers
Group III: Enlisted
Group IV: Members of the Platoon Leaders Class, Marine Corps Option NROTC, Officer Candidates Class and NAVCADs.

(Prospective officers may enter Group IV if they have not received their commission at the time the essay is submitted.)

A total of $2,000.00 will be awarded to the winners of the Marine Corps Association's 1959 Prize Essay Contest. Essays will be judged in the 4 classifications, determined by the status of the contestant (active, inactive or retired member of the Armed Forces of the US and its Allies or as a civilian). A prize of $500.00 will be awarded to the winner in each group. If no essay entered in the contest is of a sufficiently high standard of excellence, no prize will be awarded in the classification concerned. In the event of a tie, awards may be prorated.

Material dealing with original thinking on military subjects is particularly desired. Historical essays are not solicited unless they can point up some development or far-reaching thought that affects us directly today.

In addition to the prizes awarded, one or more essays may receive "Honorable Mention" and be accepted for publication. Those not receiving a prize or honorable mention may be accepted for general publication in the GAZETTE. Compensation for such articles will be as adjudged by the Editorial Board.


General Rules

1. Contestants may write on any subject of military interest but essays may not exceed 5,000 words and they must be original.
2. They must be typewritten, double-spaced, on paper approximately 8 x 11, and must be submitted in triplicate.
3. The name of the author shall not appear on the essay. Each essay heading shall contain an identifying phrase consisting of the last 5 words of the essay. This phrase shall appear:
   a) On the title page of the essay.
   b) On the outside of a sealed envelope containing the name (rank and serial number, if any) of the author.
   c) Above the name and address of the author, inside the identifying envelope.
4. Essays and identifying envelope must be mailed in a sealed envelope marked Prize Essay Contest Group (I, II, III, IV as appropriate) to the Secretary-Treasurer, Marine Corps Association, Box 1844, Quantico, Virginia.
5. Essays must be received by the Secretary-Treasurer prior to 1 October 1959.

The copyright of any essay which appears in the GAZETTE is the property of the Marine Corps Association. No liability for the loss, return, judging or reports on any essay submitted will be assumed by the Marine Corps Association or the GAZETTE and the decisions of the Editorial Board will be final. No inquiries regarding essays will be answered until final judgment has been made.

THE MARINE CORPS ASSOCIATION

"PACKAGING" MICROWAVES FOR MOUNTAIN TOPS



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But first other problems had to be solved: how to house the complex electronic equipment; how to assemble and test it at hard-to-reach relay stations way up in the mountains; and how to do it economically.

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The new Phoenix-Flagstaff radio-relay link illustrates the creative engineering that the Bell Telephone System brings to its civilian and defense assignments . . . engineering that serves the country whenever called upon, wherever needed.

BELL TELEPHONE SYSTEM

Marine Corps Gazette

SEPTEMBER 1959
NUMBER 9
VOLUME 43

PROFESSIONAL MAGAZINE FOR UNITED STATES MARINES

Published by the Marine Corps Association in order to provide a forum for the expression of matters which will advance knowledge, interest and esprit in the Marine Corps

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THIS MONTH'S COVER . . . . . Painted in 1944 by Sgt Tom Lovell, the cover illustration appeared on the October 1944 GAZETTE. Mr. Lovell is now a highly successful commercial artist living in Westport, Conn.

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This Cat No. 12 Motor Grader is undercutting banks down 28 inches deep in St. Anthony Village, Minnesota. Cutting both sides, it averages about 8 blocks a 10-hour day in compacted hardpan. Owner: J. A. Denens & Son, Inc., Minneapolis, Minn.

LOOK! THESE IMPROVEMENTS IN THE No. 12 PAY OFF IN EVEN HIGHER PRODUCTION!

Increased throat clearance · New blade, lift and circle · One-piece case for transmission and final drive · New, two-tooth power control clutches · New, positive mechanical lock

SINCE it was introduced twenty-one years ago, the Caterpillar No. 12 Motor Grader has earned the title "standard of the industry." Constant improvements have kept it the undisputed leader in its class. Here are the latest improvements that enable you to get even more work at lower cost with less maintenance from this high-production machine:


1 Clearance between the top edge of the blade and bottom edge of the circle has been increased to 5 INCHES. This provides improved rolling action, allows more material to move across the blade for greater production.

2 Blade thickness has been increased to 7/8 inch and blade beams have been increased in length and thickness to handle heavier loads. Lift arms have been lengthened and links shortened to enable operator to obtain all blade angles more easily. Circle reverse gear housing has been redesigned for better clearance as well as to increase the life of components and make service adjustments easier.

3 There's a new, stronger one-piece case for the transmission and final drive. This eliminates possible leakage at gaskets. In addition, transmission bearings have been strengthened for longer gear life.

4 New mechanical controls for reduced kickback, easier engagement. New power control clutches have two teeth, instead of four, and improved contact angles. They are more positive to engage, easier to hold in position.

5 New blade controls feature a positive mechanical lock—exclusive with Caterpillar. When the control is in neutral, the power shaft is locked by a set of gear teeth to prevent creeping.



Besides the improved new 115 HP No. 12, there are two other graders in the line—the big new 150 HP No. 14 and the 75 HP No. 112. Whatever the job, there's the right size Caterpillar Motor Grader for it!

Caterpillar Tractor Co., Peoria, Illinois, U. S. A.

CATERPILLAR

Caterpillar and Cat are Registered Trademarks of Caterpillar Tractor Co.

STEP UP PRODUCTION WITH THE IMPROVED No. 12



Return Postage Guaranteed

. . . We are sending you a copy of the publicity photographs released by this office in connection with the return of the Marine Corps Associations Combat Marksmanship award.



As indicated by the theme of the photograph, you can see that the 8th Marines (note return address) fully intend to win this year's competition and retain the honors won in 1957.

Maj K. D. Morrison
ISO, 2ndMarDiv
Camp Lejeune, N. C.

Ed: Pictured are (left) Col R. R. Van Stockum, CO, 8th Marines, and LtCol H. C. Reifel, CO of the 1stBn, 8th Marines, which sent the winning team to the 1957 Combat Marksmanship competition sponsored by the Marine Corps Association. No meet was held in 1958 because of commitments of FMF units. This year the event is scheduled for 8-12 September. Results will be published in the October issue of the GAZETTE.

Send The GAZETTE to College

. . . We are preparing a freshman English text, tentatively titled *College Language Skills* and intended especially for students who need reading materials which combine interesting content with simple, direct presentation. We plan to include articles from representative periodicals.

. . . We are interested in learning whether . . . articles which might be included in this text have appeared in the Marine Corps GAZETTE. . . . We shall appreciate your giving us their titles, . . . which issue they appeared in . . . how we can obtain copies of these issues.

We would be grateful if you would grant us permission to reprint any selections we might find suitable.

Marjorie May
Editorial Dept
Scott, Foresman & Co
Chicago, Ill.

Ed: How about it, Readers? Do you have a favorite GAZETTE article which you think fills the bill? Send us your nominations. We'll pass it along.

Fastest Gun Alive

. . . The designers of the new weapons illustrated on your August cover will be a long time recovering from the shock of seeing how your artist visualizes their use in combat.

It seems rather wasteful to see that tripod being neglected while the weapon is fired from the hip in true "John Wayne" style.

Capt Frank Zimolzak
Tactics Group
Basic School
MCS, Quantico, Va.



Ed: This is how one designer fired his weapon. Check page 28 GAZETTE: Aug '59.

Scratching a Little Deeper

. . . The article *Closing the Gap* (GAZETTE: Jul '59) has really pointed up the importance of Intelligence in aiding combat commanders and staff in their operational planning. . . . Gen Cushman was right in stating that his article "only scratches the surface." One of the basic problems of Intelligence to my knowledge is timeliness. Reports on the enemy as to location, strength and intentions must be reported to the CO quickly so he in turn can decide what action to take to exploit the situation.

I'm sure other Marines will follow with more articles on developing the mission of Intelligence.

P. G. Martin
8869 20th Ave.
Brooklyn 14, N. Y.

Setting The Pattern

. . . The Brazilian Marine Corps has initiated the printing of a periodical in Portuguese patterned on the Marine Corps GAZETTE. The aim of the magazine is to provide for wider dissemination of subjects of interest to the Brazilian Marine Corps.

They have foreseen the desirability of from time-to-time translating and reprinting articles appearing in the GAZETTE and have requested that permission be obtained to permit their doing this . . . . full credit will be given . . . for any matter republished.

J. J. Hilton
US Naval Mission to Brazil
Rio de Janeiro

Ed: Permission freely granted with best wishes to our Marine brothers-in-arms.

Retreat, Hell!


. . . Maj Hargreaves justifies retreating in his *If It Comes To It* (GAZETTE: Jun '59). He quotes such eminent leaders as . . . Lord Wellington and Gen Sir George Bell. Hargreaves, Wellington, Bell and semantics nothwithstanding, there is no place in the Marine military dictionary for the word *Retreat*.

(Continued on page 6)

★

The GAZETTE will pay $5.00 for each letter published in Message Center

★



Sikorsky S-60 —giant new flying crane

NEW CONCEPT: The S-60, prototype for future Sikorsky flying cranes, now is demonstrating in flight exciting new ways to handle both military and commercial materials and construction bottlenecks.

NEW POWER: Sikorsky flying cranes will utilize high-powered gas turbine engines, affording every advantage with its favorable power-weight ratio.

GREATER CAPACITY: The prototype S-60 lifts 5 tons with ease, with its two 2100 h.p. Pratt & Whitney Aircraft R-2800 piston engines. Turbine-powered models in design will carry from 10 to 40 tons of payload.

ALL-PURPOSE DESIGN: Cargo lifting is simplified by design that straddles the load. Specialized pods will speed movement of personnel and of communications, maintenance, and medical equipment, and will answer many other particular needs.

SIKORSKY AIRCRAFT, Stratford, Connecticut



(Continued from page 4)

. . . I prefer Smith's "Retreat, Hell," McAuliffe's simple, direct "Nuts," and Devereaux's confident "Send us more Japs." The Marine Corps' reputation is based on the offense. Let's keep it that way.

Maj M. P. Newton, Jr.
MCS, Quantico, Va.

A Piece In Search of An Author

. . . The following commentary which I feel is of interest to all career Marines first came to my attention about four years ago. I have since forgotten its origin, nor do I recall who wrote its particularly appropriate words. I'm wondering if the GAZETTE will publish it in hopes some reader can identify the author so that he may be given the credit he so richly deserves.

I heap praise upon this Private, be he foot soldier or airborne, young or older, fun-loving or seriously cognizant of his peculiar position in life. While the Private may not be the backbone of the Corps he is most certainly the nervous system of the Marine Corps. His attitude and brusque efficiency more perfectly reflect the general pattern of the whole, than any other rating.

And we, the non-commissioned officers of this illustrious group, have failed the Private as sure as he believes himself a failure. We shout the deathsong of tradition, yet extend no welcoming hand of tradition. We are so fatally intent in fierce competition for rating, we have forgotten that traditionally, we are the teacher. We fail to recognize the fact that a Private must not have responsibility; he is a responsibility, our responsibility. Just as we revel in the goodness of his accomplishment, so we are also responsible for his transgression and breaches of military etiquette. The appearance of a Private at the Mast is not justification for five days in a cell; rather, it is an indication of failure on the part of his immediate superior. The man is not incorrigible but more often confused by the alien life thrust upon him and we, the noncoms, must smooth the contours and help, sincerely help him to develop into well-rounded manhood before attempting to create a Marine.

There is no need of a dramatic appeal to emotion and senses; the fact stands clear and accusing, reproaching our conduct toward the few men privileged to be Marines and place their trust in us. We must not fail these men. As we do fail them so, also, will the present thin line of tradition wear to breaking point and the brazen discordant voices of other factions will obliterate this paragon of military aristocracy. Unless we erase the bigotry and intolerance now extant we, gentlemen, will be, and rightfully so, extinct.


AGySgt R. F. Sweeney
MCS, Quantico, Va.

Say It With Music

. . . Regarding H. S. Johnson's objections to [singing commercials] used in recruiting (*Message Center:* Jun '59) . . . he supplied his own answer, to wit—"if you think you can make the grade, we will take you and make a Marine out of you." Mr. Johnson is right on this, Marines are made, not born.

If all it takes is a simple, sugar-coated jingle to get the boys to come down to the office and sign up, we recruiters would have a lot of time on our hands to think up new jingles. Recruiting is a tough job. Because most 17 and 18-year-old youths do not yet understand the meaning or the value of esteem, dig-

(Continued on page 9)



LOW COST PROTECTION. USF ESSEX. Originally fitted out in 1799 and built by public subscription the Essex afforded low cost protection for the people of the United States. Carrying 32 guns she gained fame on her famous raiding cruise in the South Pacific from 1812 to 1814.

Eighty years later, NAVY MUTUAL AID ASSOCIATION was founded. The purpose was to give low cost protection to members of the Navy, Marines, Coast Guard, and their families. For SEVENTY-NINE YEARS NMA has continued to provide this LOW COST PROTECTION.

Write us today for our free booklet that will explain the full services and benefits of NAVY MUTUAL AID to you.

ELIGIBILITY. All permanent and temporary officers and warrant officers of the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard, including reserve officers on extended active duty, and not over 62 years of age, are eligible.

BENEFITS IN FORCE.....$190,000,000
ASSETS .....$ 39,000,000

NAVY MUTUAL AID ASSOCIATION ORGANIZED JULY 28, 1879

Navy Mutual Aid
ASSOCIATION
NAVY DEPARTMENT WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

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
GLOBE-ILITY



Dawn in a
troubled harbor.
On the horizon,
units of a U. S. Navy
carrier task force.
Yesterday they were 700 miles away.
Today the lean ships and glinting jets are here to back up
U. S. policy. They came equipped to air-land Marines, win air
superiority, or trade nuclear blows.
Few bases are so formidable in so many ways.
None is better suited for guarding the
vast and scattered resources
which form the Free World's strength.

CHANCE VOUGHT
DALLAS, TEXAS

AERONAUTICS | ASTRONAUTICS | ELECTRONICS | GENESYS CORP. | RANGE SYSTEMS | RESEARCH



500TH CRUSADER DELIVERED TO FLEET

The jet fighter that introduced 1,000-plus-mph speed to carrier decks is now with the Navy – 500 strong. Chance Vought *Crusaders* are deployed with the Sixth and Seventh Fleets as day fighters and photoplanes. Another *Crusader* version – the F8U-2N – is being armed and equipped for near-Mach 2 combat in darkness or bad weather. It will join the Fleet next year.

With the *Crusader's* dynamic design, Vought engineers broke down barriers that have stymied carrier aircraft performance. In the same way, the Navy has tuned U. S. carrier design to the changing requirements of defense. Since World War II, these floating bases have been improved 50% in all-weather operation, 100% in aviation fuel capacity and 200% in ammunition storage.

It was a supersonic step forward when these high-performance carriers were joined by the *Crusader*. The transition was completed at low risk and cost. And these fastest of all Navy fighters have since proved reliable, serviceable and economical, too, in long periods of foreign duty that have included Quemoy and Lebanon.

Design and production of high-performance aircraft make up part of the broad spectrum of Chance Vought fields of activity. Other areas include: advanced weapons, astronautics, electronics, anti-submarine warfare, range systems management, commercial process control systems.

CHANCE VOUGHT
DALLAS, TEXAS

(Continued from page 6)

nity, traditions, and pride, it is often useless to appeal to them through these channels.

The correct name for these jingles is Radio Spot Announcements and they are used as "attention getters." They are a very small part of the Marine Corps Recruiting Service's public information program, which in turn is only a small part of recruiting itself.

All hands can rest assured. No dignity is being lost by us recruiters. We are straightforward and truthful. One needs only to look over the new Marines who have just completed bootcamp to judge our recruiting methods.

ASSgt. D. V. Vereault
MCRS
215 Shurtleff St.
Chelsea, Mass.

Lend-Lease for Linguists

... Two letters in the May '59 GAZETTE—ASSgt MacKenzie's and Capt Snell's, both concerning the linguist problem—have prompted this letter. Both of the letters present a partial answer to the shortage of linguists. Sergeant MacKenzie speaks out for the language school and Capt Snell for individuals living abroad. My thoughts along this line concern a combination of the two—a language school for enlisted Marines stationed abroad, specifically those assigned security duties with the Department of State. With good liaison between the NCOinC of the Security Detachment and the Administrative Officer of the Legation or Embassy each Marine should be able, during the course of his tour of duty, to become fluent in the language of the country where he is stationed plus learning the customs of the country. With financial assistance from HQMC in the form of tuition aid a program of this nature should, within a few years, add materially to the linguist pool.

Another statement on the shortage of linguists is contained in BGen S. S. Wade's *Operation Bluebat* GAZETTE: Jul '59). ". . . there are probably many Intelligence experiences to be recounted but the primary factor that stands out to be emphasized was the lack of qualified linguists in the Second Provisional Marine Force." The following procedure established while I was with the 3d MarDiv during 1957-58 is not an answer to the shortage of qualified linguists but does make available to the G-2 a current list of personnel with recorded language ability. It is a report prepared by DPI showing name, rank, organization and language proficiency. This can be furnished monthly or at any other requested interval. The 3d Mar Div report was furnished quarterly. As I have stated, it is not an answer to the shortage but does provide the G-2 with a working list of available personnel with recorded language ability.

AMSgt R. J. Southall
MB, Naval Weapons Station
Yorktown, Va.

A Straight Shot

. . . Though not a Marine, I'm a regular reader of the GAZETTE. It is a splendid magazine but I must take exception to AGySgt McAllister's views on the current system of rifle qualification (GAZETTE: Aug '59).

What Sergeant McAllister considers an annoyance during his yearly record firing is really a vastly underestimated element in rifle proficiency. Pressure is probably the single, most disturbing thing to the majority of Marines or soldiers who are tensed up and just aching to make that expert score. And that is exactly as it should be.

What he recommended is to dilute this pressure, spread it over several days. I wonder if he ever experienced the opportunity in . . . combat . . . to take the average of several days' firing? Isn't it extremely important that the rifleman has the capability to settle down and fire with cool, calculated effectiveness under the stress of the moment? If he doesn't learn that in rifle training will he have the chance to learn it in combat?

Granted it is a terrible thing for a man to live with for a year—an "unqualified" notation in his records. But I say let him! Make him come to grips with himself and don't water down the system to make it less nerve-racking.

Capt G. A. Hoyem, USA
Building 3109
Great Lakes, Ill.

DEMOCRACY...

and the General Staff



By Gordon A. Craig and Richard D. Challener

WITHIN THE PAST TWO MONTHS there have been a number of indications of renewed interest in the possibility of reforming and unifying the nation's military staff system. The Mahon Committee of the House of Representatives has made some pointed criticisms of the Joint Chiefs; and these and General Maxwell D. Taylor's remarks, made at the time of his retirement from active service, about the frustrations he had experienced in his efforts to modernize the army, have been taken up by the Washington correspondents of some of the leading newspapers. Mr. Roscoe Drummond of the *New York Herald Tribune,* for instance, in a column written at the end of June, called for a new consideration of the Rockefeller recommendations of last year, and particularly of their proposal that the chairman of the Joint Chiefs be given additional powers and placed in command of an enlarged and unified staff, freed from the control of the separate services.

If this matter should again reach the stage of public and Congressional discussion, there is little doubt that the debate will be long and tempestuous. Both the advocates and the opponents of the General Staff concept tend to be dedicated and impassioned pleaders, as more than one post-war battle between them testifies. It is unfortunately also true that the heat of the controversy will make it harder for Congress and the public — already confused by the growing complexity of military questions and by the menacing, but hardly transparent, maneuvers of our foreign enemies—to reach a balanced judgment of the merits of the proposal. It may even lead to a failure to come to grips with the most fundamental issues involved in it.

It is probably true that most informed Americans, when confronted with proposals similar to those of the Rockefeller Committee, find themselves concerned about two basic questions. The first is whether it is politically advisable for a democratic nation like our own to reverse its past and go over to a type of military staff which it has always viewed with suspicion. The second is whether, in the event that such a staff system were adopted, the nation would derive any tangible military advantages from it. These questions cannot, of course, be given perfect and final answers, and they should not be answered categorically. They must be



"The political authority of General Staffs in Europe was directly proportional to the danger on the frontline . . . . our military leaders are now consulted on every aspect of national policy."



"The staff was acting on the naive supposition that it would be able to control Hitler. This was merely another of the egregious political errors . . . which hurt the nation."

considered in the light of the unceasing progress of military technology, the ebb and flow of foreign affairs, the emergence of new threats and the disappearance or transformation of established ones, and all the imponderables of existence in the nuclear age. Nor is this enough. They must also be viewed in the context of history; for many nations have had powerful staff systems, and their experience is not as irrelevant to our concerns as Americans sometimes like to believe.

It would certainly seem injudicious to embark upon any discussion of the potential political role of a unified staff system in a democratic state without paying some attention to the past. The history of the modern General Staff system is relatively short; it dates only from the impressive successes of the Prussian Staff in the wars of the 1860's, which led to widespread imitation of Prussian organization and techniques. Yet that history has been marked, from its very beginnings, with instances of friction between civilian and military authorities and, among the European countries, with frequent attempts on the part of the military to arrogate to themselves political authority.

The classical example of this sort of thing is provided by the history of the Prussian-German General Staff. The success at Königgrätz in 1866 and the subsequent victory over France in 1870, which established the prestige and authority of the General Staff within the Prussian military establishment, also marked the beginning of its continuous and fateful intervention in German politics. Even Prince Bismarck, the ablest of Germany's nineteenth century statesmen and a man who jealously and adroitly guarded the supreme authority of the King's ministers in matters of politics, had the greatest of difficulty in controlling the ambitions of the General Staff. During the last stages of the war with France, he narrowly averted an attempt on the part of the Chief of Staff, Helmuth von Moltke, to supersede the Chancellor in armistice and peace discussions with the enemy. In the years that followed, he had to contend with General Staff attempts to force war on Germany's neighbors (as in 1875 and 1887), to establish a foreign service of its own to compete with the official one (as it attempted to do through the corps of military attachés after 1883), and to persuade the Emperor to authorize the employment of military force for the solution of domestic problems (which was the dearest wish of its Chief, Gen von Waldersee, in the years after 1888). The political activity of the General Staff reached its height during WWI. During that conflict, its leaders drove from office the last civilian officials who recognized the impossibility of total victory and were willing to think in terms of a negotiated peace; and it was the General Staff also that, in the fall of 1918—panicking in the face of Allied attacks—insisted that the civilian authorities appeal to President Wilson for an immediate armistice, without giving them the time to make the psychological preparations that might have averted the political revolution that, shortly thereafter, destroyed the imperial regime.

During the hearings on the Reorganization Bill of 1958, Gen Nathan Twining presented the chairman of the House Armed Services Committee with an interesting essay on the history of the Prussian General Staff. It did not include any of the facts mentioned above, although, in response to questions by Representative Kilday of Texas, Gen Twining acknowledged that the Prussian General Staff had always been " a very strong organization." He might have

added that it was no less strong after 1919, despite the fact that it had been legally abolished in the Versailles Treaty of that year. Throughout the 14 years of the ill-fated Weimar Republic, civilian governments were so incapable of controlling its activities that it was able, without their complete knowledge, to make military arrangements and hold far-ranging political discussions with agencies of the Soviet Union and otherwise to conduct a foreign policy of its own. Its allegiance to the republican form of government was always fragile, as was shown by its ambiguous attitude in the crisis years 1920 and 1923. In November of the latter year, the chief of the army command tried to revert to the tactics of the war years, by informing the Chancellor of the Republic, Gustav Stresemann, that the army no longer had confidence in him; and, although the threat did not work this time, comparable tactics helped ten years later to bring down the Bruening government and contributed to the political chaos that made it possible for Hitler to seize control of the Reich.

The fact that Hitler soon extended his control over the Staff as well, which is sometimes cited to support the curious argument that the German General Staff was quite an innocent and well-intentioned organization after all, is irrelevant. In creating the circumstances that made it possible for Hitler to come to power, and in standing by as he did so, the Staff was acting on the naive supposition that it would be able to control him. This was merely another of the egregious political errors with which its history is filled and which always hurt the nation more than it did the Staff.

Germany is not the only country in which the historian finds disturbing evidence of political activity on the part of General Staffs. The student of French history will immediately think of the Dreyfus case. This affair, which originated in the cashiering of a General Staff Officer who was mistakenly accused of selling military secrets to a foreign Power, dragged on until it threatened to disrupt the civil peace and destroy the social fabric, simply because the General Staff was unwilling to admit its original error and used its political power to avoid having to do so. Relying on the plausible argument that the honor of the French army must be preserved and that any intimation that the Staff was not infallible would give aid and comfort to France's enemies, the military and their supporters were able to paralyze the energies of the government for almost four years, during which time there were shocking intimations of the army's willingness to put its own interests before those of the Republic. In the years that followed, also, the recurrent and frequently bitter debate between generals and politicians provided numerous cases of that disease so endemic among European staffs—the stubborn delusion that soldiers, by being above politics, were somehow better judges of the national interest than politicians or, indeed, anyone else. It was, for instance, the Chief of the French Staff who, in 1940, cruelly informed Premier Paul Reynaud that his authority required no respect since he merely represented "one of those ephemeral governments of which the Third Republic has already had more than one hundred in the seventy years of its existence."

When one turns to the countries of eastern Europe, the examples of political malfeasance on the part of General Staffs are so numerous that they cannot all be cited in a short article. It is well known, however, that the Austrian General Staff played a leading part in the movement that, after 1906, urged the necessity of destroying Serbia, that the Russian General Staff was active in the dissemination of Pan Slav propaganda among the Balkan states and in organizing the league that caused the Balkan wars of 1912-13, and that the bomb plot at Sarajevo, which actually triggered the war of 1914, was planned by a Serbian General Staff officer who was also the dominant figure in the Black Hand Society. Those who are interested in the difficult relationship between civilian government and military staffs in eastern Europe before WWI should read Joachim Remak's account of the circumstances leading to the Sarajevo assassination.

British history, to be sure, reveals less evidence of this sort of thing than is to be found in the history of continental countries, but even in Britain there have been occasions when the military has threatened to penetrate the civilian sphere in a dangerous way. During WWI, for instance, the Prime Minister often had difficulty in making it clear to the military that the civilian authority must prevail. So great was the friction that even the mild-mannered Herbert Asquith, commenting on what he considered to be the sinuosities of General Staff maneuvering, could say that it "kept three sets of figures, one to mislead the public, another to mislead the Cabinet, and the third to mislead itself." In a more general sense, it is surely not without significance that, ever since the passage of the first Mutiny Act in 1689, the British have been almost inordinately vigilant with respect to the intrusion of military influence into spheres not properly military; and, even in the most critical moments of war, they have resisted the pressure to go over to forms of military organization which might unduly concentrate power and permit its misuse, preferring always to rely upon committee systems that to some American eyes appear dangerously decentralized.

At this point it is fair to ask what

"The Chief of the French Staff . . . in 1940 informed Premier Paul Reynaud that his authority required no respect. . . . Loyal to a system which had always feared dissent and which had condemned and expelled rebels like Charles de Gaulle, Weygand sought . . . to oppose the revolutionary strategical ideas of the Germans with . . . sand table orthodoxies."





all these examples have to do with the United States of America.

That there have been genuine differences between the European countries and our own is undeniable. It is true, for instance, that, in Continental Europe, civilian governments have often not tried very hard to oppose military influence. They have been weak or complacent when confronted with political aggrandizement on the part of the military, whereas the US government has always had a tradition of vigilance with respect to military encroachments that is, if anything, stronger than that noted in the case of Great Britain. Moreover, in Europe, military excesses in the field of politics have often been encouraged by legal ambiguities, whereas civilian control of the military in this country has from its beginnings been buttressed by clearly defined constitutional safeguards like those which give Congress the responsibility to "provide for the common defense" and "make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces," and, in a more general sense, by the principle of the separation of powers.

While this is true, it is worth noting that these safeguards were most effective in an age which already seems remote from our present concerns—when it was difficult to think of our national security being genuinely threatened and when, consequently, foreign problems seemed so unreal that one Washington wit could say that "the foreign policy of the United States is to have no foreign policy." Today we live in an age of continual crisis and constant menace, and our military leaders, whose advice was rarely solicited by national policymakers until less than a generation ago, are now consulted on every aspect of national policy. It is precisely here that the European experiences becomes relevant, for the conditions in which decision-making now takes place in the United States are indistinguishable from the kind of crisis conditions in which European staffs of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries gained the prestige that made civilian governments endure their political activities or rendered them incapable of preventing them. After all, the political authority of general staffs in Europe was directly proportional to the danger on the frontiers, and the behavior of the French generals in the Dreyfus case would never have been tolerated if the French public and the civil government had not been hypnotized by the threat which foreign espionage posed for the national security.

It is not sufficient to answer this point by saying that American soldiers have always respected the supremacy of the civilians and consequently are unsuited to the role of "political generals" in the European sense. Nor is it enough to take comfort in the proposition, recently emphasized in our military sociology, that, because of the increasing degree of civilian-military collaboration and overlapping of functions in the American government, the European dichotomy between the soldier and the civilian can have no meaning in this country. There is doubtless something in this, but not enough to be reassuring in face of the marked deterioration of constitutional controls in the last few years, and the indifference with which this has been regarded by the advocates of unification.

If, for instance, we consider the powers which the national legisla-

ture has with respect to the military, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that they are being steadily eroded by the increasing complexities of every aspect of national defense. Ten year ago Elias Huzar, in his book *The Purse and the Sword,* noted that Congress' power over the budget, which is the very key to civilian control, was becoming less effective because of the great sums of money involved and the virtual impossibility of mastering the details of ballooning service requirements. Today, with the annual military budget of forty billion dollars, these difficulties have been further increased. In a situation in which only the exceptional Congressman has the time to make himself a genuine military expert, the average Senator or Representative must rely for the information that will enable him to carry out his Constitutional responsibilities upon various expedients, such as the guidance of officials of the executive branch of the government, the informed opinion of non-government agencies and individuals who specialize in military affairs, and, not least, the freedom that high ranking officers of the separate services possess to give their views to Congressional committees.

Proposals for an enlarged and unified staff system, like those included in the Rockefeller recommendations, would almost certainly contribute to the weakening of Congressional powers, if only because they would discourage the expression of service views contrary to unified staff doctrine and to this extent would cut off a vital source of Congressional information. But this is not the only way in which such proposals would threaten civilian control over the military establishment, for it may be argued that they would weaken even those devices for control which have hitherto been provided in the executive branch of the government. They would virtually eliminate the already reduced powers of the service secretaries, who in the past have had a useful control function, and would leave the Secretary of Defense as the sole remaining civilian authority, aside from the President, charged with the duty of controlling the newly unified staff and maintaining the principle of civilian supremacy.

Dr. Craig, a Marine officer in WWII and a frequent lecturer at the National War College, specializes in the fields of diplomatic and military history at Princeton Univ. Following WWII he served as board chairman of Princeton's Marine Corps History Project which published in 1951 a searching study of the Marines' working-principles of amphibious warfare. His most recent work, "From Bismarck to Adenauer: Aspects of German Statecraft," was published in 1958. Scotland-born, he was educated at Princeton Univ where he is now a Professor of History.

It is doubtful if any single official could measure up to the requirements of this staggering assignment. One of the country's most thoughtful students of military affairs, Mr. Struve Hensel, has written persuasively that the Secretary of Defense would be "buried under an avalanche of work, with all his advice, except in respect to research and engineering and on the logistical support side, coming from the military. He (would) never be able to do anything but follow the recommendations of the military . . . The Chairman (of the Joint Chiefs) would be the only adequately informed top official."



If this happened, the American Staff would indeed have reached a position comparable to that occupied by its European counterparts of the late nineteenth century. This is not to say that it would deliberately abuse this position; it is merely to suggest that, at a minimum, it would be increasingly difficult to resist Staff advice in political questions and that, in times of national crisis or disaster, there would always be a tendency to allow arguments of military expediency to receive undue weight.

But let us, for the purposes of argument, assume that a united staff system could somehow be established without any of the political dangers discussed above. Would it offer any tangible military advantages?

It is clear that the advocates of an enlarged and strengthened staff system believe that this will eliminate pointless debate and inefficient planning and make possible the expeditious devising, as the Rockefeller report puts it, "of a comprehensive and coherent strategic doctrine" that is not based on compromise between the views of the different services. A pertinent question would seem to be, however, whether this nation can afford to place its reliance upon a single strategical concept or doctrine.

It is of course true that the strategy of a great nation cannot be improvised from day to day; there must be a plan, and it should always be guided by a realistic view of the national interest and national capabilities and be founded upon reasonable agreements about the basic elements of policy. But it is also possible to carry insistence upon agreement to a point which is self-defeating. Certainly a strategy which does not provide for alternative courses of action, which is not continuously subject to basic criticism, and which, above all, is not guided by an awareness of the fact that one can never perfectly predict the future course of international relations, promises to be fatal in its results. History is filled with examples to prove this.

In 1914, for example, the participants in the first world conflict all suffered from the fact that their General Staffs had for a generation been engaged in devising single, comprehensive strategic plans from which, at the hour of mobilization, no deviation could be tolerated.[1] No more rigid war plan can be imagined, for instance, than the so-called Schlieffen Plan which was the pride and glory of the German General Staff. In 1909, when the younger Moltke, at that time Chief of Staff, was asked by his Austrian opposite number what Germany would do if Russia went to war against Austria

Dr. Challener is an authority in the related fields of American Foreign Policy and military history. After three years Army service in WWII he returned to Princeton Univ and graduated in Jan '47 as a member of the class of '44. He joined the Princeton faculty in 1949, and subsequently earned a masters' degree and doctorate from Columbia Univ. In 1955 his doctoral dissertation, "French Theory of the Nation in Arms: 1866-1939," was published. Now an assistant Professor of History and assistant Dean of the College he has frequently written for professional history journals.

because of her Balkan policy, he answered that Germany would, of course, mobilize against Russia but that, before she took any action in eastern Europe, she would have to dispose of France. This was in accordance with Schlieffen's prescription for a general war, which, the Staff believed, must begin with a German attack on France, no matter where the *casus belli* occurred. It is said that, in 1914, when the Russian mobilization was under way, a report (later discovered to be erroneous) reached Berlin claiming that Britain would remain neutral in any hostilities that might ensue, provided Germany did *not* assault France. Upon receipt of this, the Emperor suggested to his Chief of Staff that it appeared advisable to turn all troop movements toward the Eastern front. He received the answer that Germany had only one war plan and that to attempt to change it now would be to invite disaster.

What was true of Germany in 1914—and of Russia, whose Chief of Staff destroyed his telephone connection with the Imperial Palace lest he be asked to change troop dispositions based on a preconceived plan as rigid as Schlieffen's—was noticeable also in the opening phases of WWII, when peacetime plans were put to the test and, on the Western side at least, found wanting. When the campaign in the Low Countries began in 1940, the Allied armies, in accordance with a long-considered plan, moved into Belgium and Holland, relying upon the Ardennes barrier to prevent the Germans from breaking through to the northeastern plains. As early as 1928, B. H. Liddell Hart had declared that this conception was "based on a delusion." Yet, as Col A. Goutard has



written in his recent study of the campaign of 1940, the assumptions on which the plan was based had never been abandoned. Indeed, even after it was evident in May 1940 that the German panzer assault was breaking the Allied line at its hinge, the Allies continued their now pointless operations in the Low Countries until the concentric movements of their foe had made inevitable the subsequent brutal disillusionment of Dunkirk.

In both 1914 and 1940, the belligerents also suffered from the fact that, when their initial plans had failed, they were unable to adjust themselves to the war that had betrayed their expectations. It is well known, for example, that the pre-1914 thinking of all European Staffs was based upon a firm faith in the power of the offensive and the confident expectation than any general war would be decided within a matter of weeks. When these assumptions proved false and the armies bogged down after the battle of the Marne, none of the European General Staffs was able to adjust its thinking to the new conditions of trench warfare. Prewar insistence upon single strategical concepts seems almost to have resulted in a shriveling of intellectual resilience. Even the German General Staff showed a remarkable paucity of invention and, after four years in the trenches, could devise no better strategy than the Ludendorff offensive of 1918, an imperfect copy of the Schlieffen plan, launched under infinitely less favorable circumstances and doomed to inevitable defeat. In 1940, when Gen Weygand replaced Gamelin after the débacle in the Low Countries, he too found it impossible to break the hold that inherited staff traditions had over him. Loyal to a system which had always feared dissent and which had condemned and expelled rebels like Charles de Gaulle, Weygand sought momentarily to oppose the revolutionary strategical ideas of the Germans with the sand-table orthodoxies of St. Cyr, and then gave up the battle.

Singlemindedness on the part of staffs tends, once it has become established doctrine, to communicate itself to the thinking habits of civilian officials who have, in any case, a tendency to defer to men in uniform when technical military matters are at issue. Bethmann-Hollweg, the wartime leader of Germany in 1914, once said that it was difficult even for the Chancellor of the Reich to oppose strategical views which the military unanimously endorsed. It would be difficult to find a single responsible civilian leader in any of the continental European countries before 1914 who disagreed with the concepts elaborated by their General Staffs. In the case of France in the 1930's, it is surely significant that the doctrinaire views of the French General Staff were accepted by the responsible political leadership of the state, both Daladier and Blum, for instance, believing in the Maginot Line with all the fervor of Gamelin and Pétain. Historically it has almost invariably been true that excessive staff orthodoxy has bred a dangerous degree of national conformity.

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[1]It is sometimes argued that the examples of pre-1914 staffs are not relevant, since these were entirely composed of officers from the land armies. Yet, for all practical purposes, late nineteenth and early twentieth century European staffs were "unified," for the dominance of the land army was so great that the views of the army staff were the views of the military establishment as a whole—or, at least, were so treated by civilian governments on the Continent. The German navy was so unimportant until the beginning of the twentieth century that its leaders had negligible influence on German strategic policy (for twenty years after the founding of the Empire the post of Chief of Admiralty was actually filled by general officers of the army) and national policy was determined by the General Staff of the army. This was true also of Austria-Hungary and (especially after 1906) of Russia.

These historical examples have a direct relevance to our own concerns at the present. There has, in fact, already been a strong drift in this country toward a single strategical concept, a concept which has received the name of "massive retaliation"; and it has found as many adherents in civilian circles as it has in military groups. Indeed, more than one critic has charged that this doctrine—combined with a reduction in the number of ground forces and the budgetary pressures brought to bear on the services—has already weakened American foreign policy by throwing doubt on the capacity of the United States for limited warfare. That more serious results have not been experienced is to be explained, first, by the fact that the doctrine has not yet been put to a major test and, second, by the fact that service unity has been so imperfect as to assure a healthy dissidence within the military establishment. The fact that the Joint Chiefs have included officers who disagreed violently with the concept of sole dependence upon massive retaliation and have maintained their right to make their views known to a wider public has prevented the imbalance in our defensive posture from becoming so great that it cannot be corrected.

Before one yields, therefore, to the argument that a unified staff is desirable because it will promote the devising of a united strategic doctrine, one must ask oneself whether the national interest will not be better served by the very diversity and competition which the united staff advocates seem to condemn.

It might be well at this point to remember that the eventual success of Allied operations in Europe in WWII was in a very real sense the result of competition between strategies, between the British desire to exploit the Mediterranean and the American insistence upon a cross-Channel attack at the earliest possible date. The conflict of views was often stormy, and reaching compromises was not always easy; but there can be little doubt that the Allied cause benefited from this. Yielding to the American desire for a cross-Channel attack in 1943 would have been as dangerous as continued indulgence of Churchill's Mediterranean plans in 1944.

Competition has always played an important and generally beneficial part in the devising of the national strategy of the United States. On more than one occasion, for instance, a drift toward strategic monism or inflexibility of military posture has been prevented by strategical debate between the Executive and Congress; and this has led Samuel P. Huntington, a close student of civil-military relations in the US, to point out that a healthy pluralistic tendency in American military policies has been possible, not only because of service differences (which have an undeniable importance in this regard) but "through the operation of the separation of powers." Indeed, he adds, the very features of Congress which are most frequently criticized, its particularism and parochialism, "work to enhance the military security of the United States."

> ***"It is difficult to find any advantages . . . from . . . a unified staff.'***

In other important fields of national endeavor, the values of competition have been recognized; and there are signs of a reversal of the past tendencies toward increasing centralization. In a critical discussion of recent attempts to centralize the defense establishment, Mr. Walter Millis has noted that the largest American businesses, such as General Motors, actually maintain their various subdivisions as "separate operations . . . to keep them in strong competition with each other as well as with outside producers." (It is somewhat ironic that civilian officials, coming to government from an industrial background that places so much emphasis upon the value of the competitive spirit, should so often be appalled by encountering the same competitive outlook among officers of the Army, Navy, and Air Force). In the vitally important field of scientific research and development, increasing doubts have been raised about the advisability of eliminating duplication of effort. At the end of a three-year Rand Corporation study of research and development techniques in this country since WWI, Burton Klein wrote, in the May 1958 issue of *Fortune*, that "it would be a terrible mistake to do anything which would lessen competition among the armed services in research and development." He pointed out that, contrary to public belief, it was precisely because of competition and duplication of effort that such things as radar, the proximity fuse, and even the atomic bomb were developed in relatively short periods of time; and he added that despite the exigencies of the Marxist party line, the Russians "have no horror of competition" in their research and development programs. In our own history, Mr. Klein found that "those areas of development in which there has been the most interservice competition have, as a rule, seen the most rapid progress." The development of engines for military aircraft in the US in the 1930's was hastened by the fact that two separate agencies, the Army and the Navy, were involved in the research, with the result that "the mistakes or omissions of one were corrected in a surprisingly large number of instances by the actions of the other."

These examples should be enough to stir doubts about the validity of arguments in behalf of unified staff plans. Indeed, when one returns to the question posed at the outset, it is difficult to find any tangible advantages which would follow from the establishment of a unified staff. On the contrary, it might very well lead to a shriveling of this nation's resources for self-criticism. It is difficult to resist the thought that, once it was fully established and its orthodoxies defined, what Mr. Hanson Baldwin calls the "dissidence of dissent" would be forced to disappear. When that happened, Mr. Baldwin himself might find it difficult to secure the information which enables him to act as an unofficial military critic, and the same difficulty would be experienced by the various independent and university-based research organizations which specialize in military affairs and exert a healthy influence on national military discussions. It is hard to believe that this sort of thing, and the simultaneous weakening of the role of Congress, would redound to the national advantage. USMC

to the "Halls of Montezuma"



Reprinted from Marine Corps GAZETTE, Oct '44.
Cover by Tom Lovell.

THE BLOOD-SMEARED REMNANTS OF A BATTALion of Marines triumphantly entered Mexico City in the early morning of 14 September 1847. Though these Marines (attached to the command of Gen Winfield Scott) had seen only two days of major fighting in the Mexican War, they had contributed much to the record of the Marine Corps in Mexico.

At Chapultepec Castle two assault parties under Maj Levi Twiggs and Capt J. G. Reynolds of the Marine Corps stormed up the precipitous walls of the castle and into the grounds. After conquering this fortress, two miles across the marshy lands from Mexico City proper, the Americans turned toward the Halls of the Montezumas. Connecting Chapultepec with the capital city were two wide well-elevated causeways which terminated at the San Cosme and Belen gates, respectively. Down the middle of each causeway ran an aqueduct, resting upon open arches, which afforded some cover. It was across these causeways that the American soldiers and Marines advanced. MajGen W. J. Worth's troops (containing units of Marines) took the causeway leading to the San Cosme gate.

MajGen John A. Quitman, a Mississippi lawyer who had volunteered in the army for the Mexican War, was ordered by Gen Scott to lead his men to the Garita Belen, by far the more heavily defended of the two entrances, and to make a harassing attack to divert the attention of the enemy from Gen Worth. Quitman's forces consisted of the New York, South Carolina, and Second Pennsylvania volunteer regiments, and a battalion of Marines. The column advanced from arch to arch under the most destructive fire. Santa Ana himself was at the gate, inspiring the Mexicans to a frenzy of patriotism.

At the end of the causeway Quitman assembled 400 men for an assault on the Garita Belen and was giving instructions to Maj Loring, the officer selected to lead, when Loring's left arm was carried away by a cannon ball. No other officer of the proper rank was at hand, so Gen Quitman himself led the party and was the first within the works. He waved his men forward and in a few minutes the whole column had moved up into a compact group—a large portion within the gate itself. Thus a position was actually established within the city of Mexico shortly after noon on 13 September. But until nightfall the men were under the withering fire of the guns of the Citadel, a fort 300 yards from the gate.


Shortly after dark, Santa Ana and his men retreated quietly from the city, leaving behind only deserters and convicts released from the city prisons. Meanwhile, Quitman's men worked feverishly to improve their defenses within the gate. At dawn the next day, just as the Americans were ready to open fire on the Citadel, it surrendered.

The triumphal march into the city began. The general, on foot and wearing only one shoe, led the march. Behind him followed the mud-spattered and bloodstained troops with little attempt at military formation. They were fired upon by the convicts, deserters, and by hostile citizens. The streets were empty and the place presented the appearance of a city of the dead, except for unseen snipers who operated from housetops, windows, and around corners. The Americans marched through the Citadel grounds and then moved on to the plaza and National Palace—the Halls of the Montezumas. They raised the American Flag over the National Palace—and the Marines cleared it of robbers and thieves, who had flocked in after Santa Ana had evacuated. The Marines, in their colorful cross-belted uniforms, then calmly began patrolling the National Plaza. A few days later Gen Quitman was appointed military governor of Mexico City.

USMC

"...WELL WORTH THE E

By AGySgt Raymond A. Davis




Faced with the problem of too little time, many units are forced to let certain aspects of their training programs shift for themselves. Often they falter and die out. There are no limits as to what subjects can be featured in such a library. Type and needs of each unit govern the contents. Existing training aids can be employed, augmented by material made locally. It can be simple or as elaborate as time, space, material and imagination dictate.



THE PROBLEM: Modern jet aircraft take more maintenance, more pilot training. Linked with manning levels, administrative burdens, more complex weapons and techniques to use them, the problem is to find time for training all hands in key subjects. Of all such subjects, combat intelligence is widely recognized as important, but possible to postpone. MAG-13, 1stMarBrig, faced the problem of how to get this training across without going to a 36-hour day. Its experience may help others.

FIRST APPROACH: A conventional group-scheduled intelligence training program. The MAG S-2 section was in good shape. Each member could put across at least two of the 14 planned subjects. Good training aids and classroom facilities were on hand. Initial interest: good. Attendance: dwindling to specialists only.



About two months were spent completing 13 displays, reading material, comfortable seating, and special lighting. Included are an electrical aircraft recognition tester; model aircraft and ships; an escape and evasion exhibit with handout pamphlets; a tropical survival display; sea survival display with parachute raft kit and solar still; a world situation map; and the Code of Conduct. The center of the library features a six-part display covering combat Intelligence, security, the communist bloc, aviation safety and a recommended reading list.

E EFFORT"


SECOND APPROACH: An "on-call" program. Squadrons to schedule the periods; Group to make the classes available. Initial interest: good. Attendance: gradually dwindling.


THE FREE-TIME APPROACH: An attractive Training Library, framed to lure the student in his free time into "browsing around." By this use of free time for self-improvement, unit training can approach the 36-hour day we sometimes think is needed to get in all required subjects. Any unit, ground or air, can use this idea, and feature subjects most needed. A training library can be as simple or as elaborate as time, space, material, and imagination dictate. Initial interest: good. Attendance: continuing. Comment by inspectors: "Here is the *positive* approach. If one Marine survives, escapes, evades the enemy, or successfully completes a mission due to know-how from this library, it will be well worth the effort."




The entire library is portable so that all or part of it can be lent to squadrons to augment their training programs. Not a "one shot affair," the displays are constructed to allow periodic changes. All exhibits are of the double or "walk around" type.

Requirements for intelligence training are established by higher authority and include aircraft and ship recognition; escape and evasion; survival, both on land and sea; area studies; and current world situation.





The library features a relief terrain model of the Island of Kahoolawe, the local naval target island. Requiring about 1000 man-hours to produce, this model is conservatively valued at $3,500.00, and was produced by the group S-2 section as part of the section's internal training program. If it had been commercially built, the estimated cost of the library and its contents would exceed $10,000.00.



EMPLOY THE ONTOS

By Capt Charles G. Cooper


TOO OFTEN WE HEAR THAT THE Ontos is a "defensive weapon." This has lost it many friends in this offensive-minded Marine Corps, which for the first time faces a potential enemy with massed armor capability. Certainly the least understood of our unclassified weapons, Ontos is the source of frequent and often heated discussions. Experienced field commanders puzzle over its best use. S-3's often dismiss it as a poor tank substitute. Rifle company commanders dislike the idea of its drawing enemy fire—and widespread misconceptions run rampant. Often our photographers and illustrators take liberties which further compound the mistaken belief that we now have a small, cheap tank. Why is this weapon so controversial? Why do so many experienced officers lack even a basic knowledge of its employment? Why does its correct employment remain a mystery?

Answers to the above questions must consider the newness of the weapon itself, the acute shortage of available tactical doctrine, and the never-ending problem of realistic tank play in peacetime training. Having previously expressed many of these opinions as an Ontos Company Commander with the 1st Marine Brigade and instructor on its employment in the Basic School, I feel it appropriate to stimulate some Marine Corps-wide thinking on the use of this misunderstood yet highly potent weapon.

Primarily designed to provide medium range antitank fire power, it is a vital addition to our antimechanized defense picture. Its best use is in conjunction with air, tanks, artillery, naval gunfire, and the antitank units of each battalion. A fact well worth initial emphasis is that this stubby, yet neat, little iron monster is not represented as a tank. Neither is it a substitute for a tank as a close support assault weapon that can close with the enemy. It does, however, replace the tank as an antitank weapon within the organizational structure of the Marine Division. For the many skeptics we will admit that it is vulnerable, requires considerable maintenance, has a tell-tale backblast and carries a limited ammunition supply. For every negative aspect of the Ontos, we can list at least 1,000 pressing requirements for this compact weapon with its simple, massed firepower capability. These pressing reasons are obviously Russian tanks. Employed in mass formations, backed by self-propelled guns and artillery, heavily armored and concentrated attacks cannot be contained by our supporting arms, rocket launchers and jeep or mule-mounted 106mm rifles.

The Ontos company with its ninety 106mm recoilless rifles develops

ten times the firepower of the old regimental antitank company. It moves into positions rapidly to mass fires over some terrain that even tanks cannot negotiate. The Ontos is not designed to ride out and do battle with tanks in the open, but the important fact is simply this: Whichever hits first—tank or Ontos—wins. At one-quarter the size, with six guns to a tank's one, Ontos' effective range with trained gunners is 1,500 yards. For comparison, the average tank kill in WWII and Korea varied between 800-1,100 yards. These little vehicles can outrange a heavy tank, are air transportable, quickly serviced and more easily camouflaged. They can do a real job for you if used properly. Let's look into the picture a little more closely and see how.



The 45 Ontos of the Division Antitank Battalion divide into three lettered companies, each with 15 vehicles. At present, it is the primary antitank weapon of the division. While it must be used in close coordination with all other supporting arms and tanks when possible, it is primarily a defensive weapon. Its missions are: 1) To provide depth to the assigned zone. 2) Protect flanks and rear from armored envelopment. 3) To reinforce regimental defenses with mobile reserves.

All emphasis should be given to defending the most likely armored approach routes. Its secondary mission as an infantry close support weapon is assumed as a dual function but the capability to engage armor must be maintained by holding back adequate reserves.

To consider employment of the Ontos, we must know its key features. Highly mobile, it has few restrictions on movement, can cross all bridging organic to the Marine Corps, and possesses vast tank-killing firepower. On the other side, Ontos is vulnerable to antitank fire, tanks, artillery, land mines and even some antipersonnel mines. Ammunition resupply, backblast, and refueling also affect the pattern of employment. Its characteristics best adapt it to combat from defilade. After engaging the enemy, Ontos should displace as rapidly as possible. It just isn't built to spearhead an attack, should not be grabbed as tank-type troop carriers, but does make an excellent close support weapon when provided with security by infantry units. Success almost completely depends on prior reconnaissance and planning. These must be continuous and, when time permits, should be carried out down to squad (individual Ontos) level.

Position Selection and Routes of Movement

With the accent on advance planning and reconnaissance, use of airborne observers for position survey and early warning can be a major help. When time permits, numerous positions are selected both laterally and in depth. In conjunction with positions, routes of entry and movement must be considered.

An ideal route causes minimum conflict with infantry units, offers rapid transit, can be traveled night or day, uses available cover and concealment, and allows for redeployment should the enemy threat be altered. Positions themselves resemble those for other crew-served weapons. Primary, alternate and supplementary positions for either individual Ontos or sections are selected. Ideally, each unit needs more than one alternate position. Unless armored threats are extremely small and easily handled, Ontos displaces after each fire mission.

Let's go a step further in discussing positions and offer two new terms that will speak for themselves. The first is just what its name implies, a *ready position.* This is a protected area occupied by a platoon or section, while the battle is developing, located so the unit can move quickly to the problem area or firing position. This gives us flexibility and permits massing fires rapidly.

Second, we have a *cover position.* This is simply a position for an Ontos or section in or near the firing position which affords all available cover and concealment. Ontos moves from the ready position to the cover position when it appears that attack is imminent. Normally, a minimum of one crew member dismounts at an observation point. He prepares to move the vehicle into firing position when a target within range has been sighted. Early exposure in a hull-defiladed firing position would throw the advantage to armor with its high velocity and longer-ranged guns.

To control all Ontos unit movement, it helps to use either a series of thrust lines or pre-determined checkpoints for reports on positions, routes and likely avenues of approach. Changed frequently, this system precludes extensive use of coordinates, cuts down communications time, and offers minimum security problems.

As in all crew served weapons, flanking fire, mutual support, and



Capt Cooper is a platoon commander at Basic School, MCS, Quantico, and has instructed there in the employment of the Ontos. Previously he was with the 4th Marines, 1stMarBrig serving in a variety of billets including AssistantBn S-3 and CO of an Ontos company. Commanding a rifle platoon in Korea in 1951, he was wounded in action twice and awarded the Silver Star. He has also served as Instructor-Inspector of a Reserve infantry company.

depth are sought. Assignment of the same sector of fire to two Ontos employed in depth is generally advisable. The advantages of using Ontos in pairs are obvious when you consider communication difficulties, control, recovery, added depth, and massing of sufficient fires.

A tactical section (as distinct from the T/O) consists of two or three vehicles, the size depending on the mission. Flanking fire is ideal for several reasons. You get surprise, more target is presented, it's hard to maneuver against, and backblast is less readily noticed. Mutual support lets one vehicle cover the other's dead space caused by terrain irregularities. Depth provides flank protection, mutual support, and can limit a penetration before it reaches vital rear areas.

Defensive Considerations

In the defense, Ontos units are capable of a wide variety of missions. When the armor threat is remote, they should not be assigned routine roadblock type missions nor tasks that waste their ability to displace rapidly. At such low-danger times, these missions are better assigned to other antitank weapons such as individual recoilless sections from within the battalions.

Generally, Ontos should be centrally located in ready positions to move and oppose enemy armored attacks. This gives crews a chance to perform necessary preventive maintenance or repairs without announcing their locations. When antimechanized conditions warrant, they displace either to cover or firing positions to meet the impending threat. Using ground guides, they can do this even under cover of darkness or unfavorable weather. Another mission well within unit capabilities is to locate a platoon or section reinforced by infantry and forward observers well forward in concealed firing positions, much like a combat outpost. Ease of camouflage and speed of movement make Ontos ideal for a good-size ambush. Close control and coordination with all supporting arms ensure choice of the right time of fire for best results in halting an armored column.

Basically, the individual Ontos will await enemy attack in either of two ways: first, from cover or firing positions, or second, from ready positions, prepared to move to one or more previously selected points. Ontos held in ready positions guard against feints, as well as the use of smoke or reduced visibility to cover attacks. Tying down all units to specific locations before a threat has developed is poor employment; too often this happens as a result of indiscriminate attachment. The substitution of an Ontos for a tank on combat patrols to "flush" the enemy is not good.

Ontos is not a quiet vehicle, something to remember when displacing at night. For total noise, however, it is much quieter than a tank and not quite as noisy as a 6 x 6 truck. It's a beauty of a weapon for an S-3 with imagination.

Tank-Ontos Employment

This pleasant situation where cousins work together can find the Ontos operating offensively in flank areas not readily accessible to tanks. When our tanks make contact Ontos are ideally suited to engage the enemy from their screening positions. Moving to the rear and flanks, they give excellent depth and support against counterattack. In the defense, tanks provide a "Sunday punch" to counterattack, eject, or cut off any armored spearhead that has penetrated our lines. While Ontos firepower can limit or contain such penetrations, the heavily armored tanks are best equipped to close with and successfully eliminate the threat.

Armored columns with LVT-mounted troops find Ontos well suited for use as a flank screening force, close support weapon, or to add depth to the lead armored elements.


Amphibious Employment

Ontos units are ideal On Call serials and should land at the discretion of the Landing Force Commander. Their size and characteristics facilitate loading. Two Ontos fit easily into an LCM-6, whereas a reinforced platoon, five Ontos, jeep, ¾-ton truck, and 6 x 6 truck with preloaded supplies all fit nicely into two LCU with room to spare. When assigned an independent mission, a platoon normally needs this support to keep operating for a limited period of time.


All units should be landed as soon as possible after the beach area is cleared, whether armor is reported in the area or not. Ontos can perform as excellent counterlanding weapons, carry out close support missions against targets further inland, and protect the beachhead during the critical first hours. To expedite availability for employment and aid rapid movement from the beach area, it is well to land radio-equipped guides with the assault waves. Their mission, similar to that of artillery or shore party reconnaissance teams, is to establish assembly areas, keep abreast of the situation ashore, and act as guides when the vehicles land. Although present tables of organization make no allowances for such personnel, platoon sergeants can be used.

Offensive Employment

In the attack, some Ontos units follow leading infantry elements, moving by bounds to covered or concealed areas, prepared to counter enemy armor and support the advance of the infantry as a close support weapon. Overhead or flanking fire on enemy strong points, motor transport and concentrations is possible when expenditure of ammunition is authorized. Ontos ammunition is not suited to firing against small numbers of the enemy dispersed in the open. When infantry seizes a position, Ontos are rapidly displaced



An Ontos churns through the surf at Vieques while a second waits to land



Camouflaged Ontos maneuvers near Mt. Fuji




Screened by smoke, Ontos advances through swamp

to assist in the defense. Priority of positions must be coordinated by the cognizant unit commanders. It depends largely on the enemy armor picture.

While Ontos has many characteristics that adapt it to engaging point targets such as bunkers, pillboxes, crew-served weapons, and roadblocks, it must not be employed so as to sacrifice its availability to engage and destroy enemy armor. With realistic tank play a difficult training problem, it's too simple for units to forget the primary reason for the existence of the antitank company. When the enemy is weak in armor and we do not have tanks readily available, the Ontos may well be the ideal weapon for reduction of protected point targets. The accuracy of the 106mm rifle is such that it will often hit the embrasure of a pillbox at 1,800 yards.

Attachment of an Ontos section to a mounted reconnaissance or combat patrol gives it much needed firepower to overcome lightly held positions such as roadblocks, small villages, and observation posts. Needing infantry protection, Ontos has the cross-country mobility, speed and range to effectively support these fast-moving, screening elements.




Six 106mm recoilless rifles give Ontos its sting

Task Organization Problems

The establishment of an antitank battalion in each Marine Division, each containing three antitank companies, normally allows one company to support each committed regiment. The three platoons in each company correspond to the number of infantry battalions and offer us wide flexibility in task organization and assignment of missions. Platoons may be employed as follows: under regimental control we could have three platoons in general support, one or two in general support with others in direct support of infantry battalions, or all three platoons employed in direct support roles. By decentralizing control, some platoons may be attached to battalions and the remainder held for either of the above roles.

Normally it is undesirable to attach an antitank platoon to a battalion unless that unit is detached or operating at a great distance from the parent unit. As a general rule, it would be unwise to employ all three platoons in a manner which reduces the regimental commander's ability to provide rapid, massed Ontos support to any threatened area. To ensure flexibility, a minimum of one platoon should be retained in general support whenever practicable. The logistical and maintenance support of an attached platoon is another critical problem for a battalion commander. This argues to keep this status to a minimum or at least limit it to short periods of time.

All of these various combinations have been tested in the 1st MarBrig and some difficult problems were pinpointed. Widely spread battal-



Rifles protected from salt air, 3dMarDiv Ontos lands in Japan


ions operating at great distances from each other can only obtain Ontos support by attachment or direct support status. Splitting the limited maintenance personnel available and ataching them to individual platoons, while solving many immediate problems, doesn't answer the long-range repair and maintenance question. Air resupply of spare parts and para-drop of replacement Ontos are logical and hopeful future solutions which are now feasible. While efforts to increase Ontos availability developed many interesting techniques of night maintenance with limited equipment, it is readily apparent that necessary preventive and routine maintenance conflicts with the problem of night security. The limited personnel in an antitank company cannot maintain more than outpost type night security. Unless augmented by infantry troops or reinforced strongly, these units must rely on others for protection against a night-fighting enemy.

Communications equipment in the antitank company doesn't equal a regiment's gear, even though the company commander's control problems are identical with those of the regimental commander. The present radio capability of the antitank company also greatly hinders effective direct liaison with infantry units. This is further compounded by the small size of each platoon and company headquarters and lack of communicators except at company.

The problems, while seemingly large, are logical by-products of a new weapons system, its adoption and general acceptance. Time, patience, and much study will surely rectify them. Possibly many readers have had success in resolving them and can help out in the "nuts and bolts" development of this new addition to our growing arsenal.

With little experience to fall back on, the 0302's now serving an Ontos battalion and company commanders are working to overcome the problems mentioned above. The urgent need for early combat readiness, shortages of training areas and ammunition, and company-level training problems all rest a heavy professional challenge on the shoulders of these troop leaders.

Their individual proficiency, knowledge, and confidence in this weapon must be complemented by other leaders who appreciate Ontos capabilities and limitations. Poor use of Ontos in field exercises limits its ability to assist you in times of real need. On the other hand, proper employment greatly speeds up the efficiency and confidence of the crews who will be working with you in the months ahead. Their mission is to assist and support the infantry. A better understanding of mutual problems can lead to a successful accomplishment of both missions. USMC



Three tank killers move through Camp Lejeune woods

★ ★ ★ ★

Another Cukelaism

IN 1926 CAPT LOUIS CUKELA was a company commander in the 6th Marines. As was the custom, a troop inspection was conducted one Saturday morning and Capt Cukela was walking down the ranks looking at the display of ID tags. His attention was drawn to one lad in the rear ranks who was not wearing ID tags.

"Boy," he asked, "where are your dog tags?"

"Sir, I left them in my locker box."

Admonishing the Marine, Capt Cukela said there were three reasons why he should be wearing his dog tags.

"The first is, the captain wants it. Secondly, if you are killed in action the corpsman can say, 'Oh! Poor Jones is dead.' The third reason is . . . (and there was a pause because he couldn't think of one) . . . the third reason is the government is getting tired of building monuments to unknown soldiers!"

Capt J. W. Dion



2dLt Donald Festa, honor graduate of the 1-59 Basic Class, was awarded the Marine Corps Association sword by LtGen M. B. Twining, Commandant, MCS, Quantico.

A former Air Force staff sergeant,



2dLt Festa was graduated from Columbia University and received his commission through the OCC program.

He has been assigned to the infantry field and will join the 2dBn, 5th Marines in November. He is the son of Mr. and Mrs. Charles Festa, Sr., of Paterson, N. J.

In a matter of seconds front-line conditions can be illustrated on a battle map at the rear area with a compact, mobile unit called the Projector Plotter.

Developed by the Army, the unit accepts information from front-line detection devices and relays it to the rear where it is received on teletype tape and decoded into electronic impulses. The impulses guide an arm-like apparatus which plots positions on a small transparent map. The map is then projected onto a screen, giving latest troop positions on a battle map. The entire operation takes less than 15 seconds.

The USS George Washington, the first Polaris-launching submarine, will be equipped with an electronic system that controls torpedoes even after they are fired.

The system, built by Sperry Gyroscope Co., will give missile-launching subs an effective ASW role and defense against enemy surface ships.

Fully transistorized, the system weighs half as much as conventional torpedo fire control equipment and can be operated by one man in emergency situations. Basically a computer, it determines a ship's position, direction and speed and then calculates the best means of "aiming" the torpedo. It can also activate torpedoes with "acoustic heads" after they have been fired.

Designed to provide rapid protection for troops, an airborne mechanical ditch digger, capable of digging a trench 4 feet deep and 24 inches wide at 12 feet per minute, now is undergoing tests at the Army Engineer Research and Development Center, Ft Belvoir, Va. Mounted on rubber tires it is capable of road speed of 35mph. It is designed to support earthwork operations on construction projects, dig ditches to six feet, excavate machine gun emplacements or foxholes.

Members of the 101st Airborne Div's Recon Scl at Ft Campbell, Ky., have taught the mechanical mule to swim—by two field expedients. The first way is to drive the mule onto a 15 x 15-foot tarpaulin, fold the sides of the tarp over and tie them. This provides sufficient buoyancy to allow the mule to be floated across a stream. A second way is to lash four small logs together alongside the frame of the vehicle, attach four air mattresses to the corners, and again the mule can be floated.

Navy tests have begun on the ASW detection system of the P5M-2 patrol seaplane.

The plane's electronic system gathers information from various detection devices within the aircraft to



coordinate tracking and destroying enemy submarines.

Tests of the system began with delivery of the first P5M-2 under the Navy's $23 million contract with the Martin Co.'s Baltimore Division.

The LARC-5, an Army amphibian, in a recent demonstration proved its ability to double the payload and water speed of its WWII predecessor, the DUKW.

Built by the Ingersol Kalamazoo



Division of Borg-Warner Corp., the LARC can carry 5 tons of cargo and has a water speed of 10mph, compared to the 2½-ton payload and 5mph speed of the DUKW. On land the aluminum-fabricated LARC has a speed of 25mph.

The T2J, the Navy's new jet trainer, has been nicknamed the "Buck-



eye" in honor of the state where it is built.

To be used for basic training in jet flight operation, the trainer is in production at North American Aviation's Columbus, Ohio, division.

A transistorized version of the Army's Silent Sentry radar has been developed.

The smaller version of the radar, which can detect enemy movements under the cover of darkness, smoke or fog, is battery-powered.

Replacing tubes with transistors cuts the set's power requirements in half and makes possible the use of a battery in place of the gasoline generator required previously.

Movements of tanks, trucks or troops are translated into identifiable sounds produced in the headsets worn by the operator. It can pick out movement within an area up to three miles and provide range, azimuth and elevation data with an accuracy within 25 yards.

A contract has been awarded to the Chrysler Corporation for research and development on a multi-fuel, compression ignition V-8 engine.

The lightweight, high-speed engine would be designed for the armed forces on a mass production basis.

The $1,100,000 contract was awarded by the Army.

Ground tests are nearing completion on the Hiller X-18, a 161/2-ton VTOL research aircraft.

A tilt-wing design enables it to perform as a conventional airplane or STOL aircraft in addition to vertical takeoffs and landings.

A reflective aggregate for runways, taxi strips and other airport pavements to make them visible at night to approaching pilots has been successfully tested.

The aggregate is composed of fine granular particles treated with a material which reflects the landing lights of aircraft, providing pilots with depth guidance and a path of light on which to land. It is visible at night on the approach of an unlighted runway from two miles at an altitude of 500 feet.

It has been in use during the past year at NAS, Norfolk, Va.

Resembling the "bazooka" of WWII and the Korean War in appearance, the Red-Eye surface-to-air missile is being developed jointly by the Marine Corps and the Army.

The missile is designed for use against low-level strafing or bombing attacks and is shoulder-fired.

Approximately four feet long, three inches in diameter and weighing about 20 pounds, the Red-Eye and its launcher can be carried by one man through underbrush and rugged terrain. When capped at both ends, the launcher tube serves as a shipping container for the missile.



The Red-Eye is a composite structure containing propellant, an electronic guidance system and a high-explosive warhead.

The Marine Corps Staff NCO Symposium, held this year at MCAS, Cherry Point, N.C., was attended by representatives from 19 major commands.

The five-day round-table discussion of problems affecting career personnel was brought to a close with an address by Gen R. McC. Pate.


Objectives of the annual symposium were outlined by Marine Corps SgtMaj Wilbur Bestwick at the opening session. SgtMaj Asa E. Huskey, HQMC, was coordinator. Decisions reached by each of five seminar groups will be forwarded to HQMC as recommendations.

Nineteen of the 32 delegates attending this year's session were accompanied by their wives.

The Army's new VTOL aircraft, the VZ-4DA, recently made its first vertical takeoff and landing with mid-air transition to horizontal flight.

Ducted fans rotating on the wingtips point straight up to lift the aircraft vertically like a helicopter (Photos 1,2,3). The ducts are turned and the craft moves forward in flight like a conventional airplane (Photos 4,5,6,7). To land, the procedure is reversed.

Manufactured by Doak Aircraft Co., Inc., it has a single shaft turbine engine.



BATTALION or REGIMENT... ONE HAS TO GO

By LtCol J. B. Sweeney

DO THE PRESENT REGIMENTAL organization and concept of employment meet the needs of modern warfare? The "present regimental organization," of course refers to the Provisional T/O for Marine Divisions which took effect in late 1957. Despite significant innovations and changes, the basic and traditional triangular structure of three infantry battalions organic to each of three infantry regiments made up the new division.

Battalions are now controlled by a relatively small tactical (regimental) headquarters without organic fire support, combat support or service support elements. Also, the regiment theoretically is out of the administrative chain now from division direct to battalions. The regiment is supposedly a tactical and training supervisory headquarters. According to official announcements, the provisional organization was designed:

1) To provide a small tactical headquarters to control organic and attached units.

2) To be sufficiently flexible to absorb attachments and to form task groups tailor-made for special missions.

3) To supervise and coordinate training of organic battalions.

4) To be capable of rapid deployment, with full equipment, by helicopter or fixed wing aircraft.

5) To possess a high degree of cross-country mobility with organic means.

During the past year several major exercises and many field exercises involving regimental-size units were held on the West Coast. These exercises tested the provisional organization and concept of employment of infantry regiments, and to a lesser extent, the division organization. Usually the exercises included varying conditions of atomic warfare. They were characterized by wide separation of units, assignment of deep objectives and huge tactical areas of responsibility to regimental commanders, and flexible plans. Tactically, emphasis went to camouflage and concealment; helicopter-borne "leap-frog" tactics; rapid movement and concentration for attacks, especially at night; aggressive patrolling (day and night) to locate and maintain contact with well-concealed and elusive aggressor forces; rapid handling of intelligence information, particularly possible atomic targets.

Experience and observation as a battalion commander and regimental executive officer in the 1st Mar Div during several of these exercises has focused my attention on what I believe are major deficiencies in the provisional organization and current concept of employment. These areas need further study and refinement of both organization and concepts of employment. They may be stated as:

1) One too many organic headquarters in the tactical chain of command from the point of enemy contact to division (company-battalion-regiment-division).

2) Insufficient infantry fire power "up forward"—specifically infantry mortars—for use by the small unit commander—and *infantry units* to provide adequate depth and frontage and patrol security on exposed flanks, especially in operations with wide separation among major units.

3) The H&S Company, Infantry Battalion, is too large and too heterogeneous for its missions (i.e., direction and control; fire support and AT defense).

4) The 4.2 mortar is inadequate as direct support artillery because of relative inaccuracy when compared to the 105mm howitzer *for this type mission.*

These are the ailments—as I see them—in our provisional organization. What is the cure?

First, we must assume that the current tables of organization are merely *one phase* in evolving a suitable tactical organization for a future war with an aggressor nuclear capability. An organization is good only if it fits the particular unit; structure requires periodic change to adapt to new conditions.

Second, we must accept the fact that traditional structures and concepts have been more or less outmoded by the impact of nuclear weapons on combat operations. I am thinking here particularly of the classical triangular infantry structure employed for many years at the regiment and division. We must tailor our major infantry-type organizations to meet the requirements of modern war. These requirements place greater stress on mobility, flexibility and control. Fighting units "eyeball to eyeball" with an enemy must have at least minimum fire support *organic* to the unit. They must be capable of semi- independent ac-



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


Figure #1

tion and have organic means to provide security and protection for themselves. Control and coordination must be simplified to aid rapid and smooth shifting of major units as the tactical situation changes. Finally, they must be highly maneuverable and capable of quick cross-country movement with organic equipment and supplies.

Third, future emphasis will be on small scale actions of company and battalion-size units fighting Indian-warfare tactics. Small unit commanders—particularly company commanders—will need considerable experience, a high degree of initiative and aggressive leadership ability. They'll fight semi-independent or isolated actions. Assigned missions must be broad, general and leave much to the judgment of subordinate commanders. Our forces must disperse over wider distances for self-preservation. This places great emphasis on mobility, flexibility of organizations, and ability of major units to mass and disperse rapidly. It intensifies the requirement for light, mobile communications of high reliability.

To improve further our organization structure, the Marine Corps should eliminate the regiment *as it now exists.* Rather than the regiment, a new unit based on the infantry battalion is proposed. This unit, a "heavy" battalion or a "light" regiment, as you will, is designed to meet the requirements outlined in the preceeding discussion.

For the present, let us call this unit a Marine Landing Team (MLT). The proposed MLT has a strength of about 1,600 officers and men; it is commanded by a colonel with a lieutenant colonel as executive officer and majors as company commanders. The MLT can attach additional infantry, combat support and service elements to form a compact, mobile and potent striking force. MLT organic units and all equipment are helicopter transportable. Organizationally, its basic characteristics are *mobility* and *flexibility.* In the latter respect it resembles our present regimental landing teams, formed around organic battalions for specific missions. However, strength-wise it falls between the battalion and regimental organizations (Fig 1). Because of its reduced size, it is maneuverable and easy to control.

Regimental-type units of such strength appear frequently in history. For example, in the Spanish Army of the 16th Century the first colonels—"Cabo de Colunela"—appeared at the head of a unit which foreshadowed the modern regiment. Later, in our own history we find frequent references to Marine regiments of 1,000-2,000 officers and men during the Spanish-American War, the Philippine Insurrection and the Boxer Rebellion. The infantry regiment of the US Army in 1939 had a strength of 69 officers and 1,670 enlisted and many will remember the "BLT" organization of 1948-49 (under the "J" tables) which were "lighter" but similar to the proposed MLT.

The MLT incorporates the quadrangular organization *down to platoon level.*

Each of four rifle companies contains four rifle platoons of four squads each and a weapons platoon. The MLT Company, including company headquarters totals eight officers and 298 enlisted Marines. Riflemen carry the M-14 rifle; the machine gun platoons have eight M-60 guns.

A major commands each company with a captain as executive officer. These ranks are justified by the strength (33 per cent greater than the current rifle company T/O) and the need for broad experience and maturity. Another innovation is the three-tube section of 81mm mortars (Fig 2) giving the company commander his own high-angle fire support weapon.

For comparison, there are 208 rifle squad members in the proposed MLT Company, or 71 per cent of the unit strength. In a similar unit under the provisional T/O only 60 per cent of the company are rifle squad members. The equivalent unit in the US Army's Pentomic Battle Group has 236 enlisted, with 132 rifle squad members, or 56 per cent of the unit. The larger company of the MLT organization makes available additional infantry




Figure #2

units required to provide adequate frontage, depth and security in dispersed operations.

The company commander with two platoons in contact has strength available for patrolling, protecting his CP and mortar positions, and yet keeps one unit as an all-important reserve. The "span of control" increases only slightly and stays within current communications capabilities.

Advantages accruing to the MLT commander with four rifle companies are similar. With three companies heavily committed the commander has one quarter of his infantry strength remaining. From this he can draw flank and rear patrols and still keep a potent reserve element with which to influence the action. The provisional organization does not provide sufficient infantry strength to allow for such flexibility.

The quadrangular MLT (Fig 3), in addition to four rifle companies, has a weapons company and a headquarters and service company. The latter contains the normal battalion headquarters and company headquarters sections as well as service, medical, communication, and motor transport platoons. Incidentally, the only vehicles in this unit are jeeps and the half-ton mechanical mules. Specialist units, such as additional antitank weapons and pioneers, are assigned as needed from division units. The H&S Company, MLT, would have a strength of 23 officers and 250 enlisted. Its primary mission is to direct and coordinate operations of the MLT and to provide the facilities for the commander to control the landing team and reinforcing elements.

Weapons Company, composed of four officers and 120 enlisted Marines, commanded by a captain, provides fire support, antitank defenses and assault teams for the MLT. The weapons unit, unlike the infantry battalion provisional organization, has been separated from H&S Company. This makes each company more manageable in size and simplifies command, training, and operational employment. Weapons Company consists of a six-tube 81mm mortar platoon (with appropriate fire control and communications personnel in the headquarters), a 106mm rifle platoon, and an assault platoon of 3.5" rocket launcher and portable flame thrower teams. Marines of the latter unit train in both type weapons and demolitions. Teams, sections or a squad are attached to MLT companies as required. The 106mm rifle platoon weapons mount on the half-ton truck, light infantry weapons carrier (mechanical mule); the platoon has sufficient "mules" to ensure cross-country mobility.

One other major point concerns the 4.2" mortars. The provisional T/O equips one of the direct support battalions with this weapon—in the 1st MarDiv it is the 1st Bn, 11th Marines. The mortar is helicopter transportable while the 105mm howitzer has distinct limitations in helicopter moves. The 4.2" mortar has many excellent features and is valuable *for certain situations.* However, its shortcomings (displacement, minimum range, and area fire capability versus accuracy) show up in direct support of attacking infantry or in defending a small perimeter. For these and lesser reasons the heavy mortars in the proposed organization go in a separate battalion under division or artillery regiment control. The latter appears to be a good solution to simplify training and fire direction operations. In any event, the heavy mortars would give way to the return of another 105mm howitzer battalion within the artillery regiment yet they would be retained, in lesser numbers, within the division.




Figure #3

That, in brief outline, is the realignment and structure proposed to replace our familiar and cumbersome regimental organization. The actual number of MLT's per Marine division could and should remain flexible. This depends on location, mission or probable employment of each division. Also, division headquarters, service and support elements should be modified so they, too, can be tailored to meet varying circumstances and different situations — emphasizing the flexible nature of this organization.


For those who feel strongly about the traditions of our present units, let it be said that they would be preserved by designating each MLT by number to correspond with existing (and WWII) regiments. Thus, the 1st Marine Landing Team would be known service wide as the "1st Marines" and would fall heir to the colors, traditions, and battle honors of our oldest regiment.

One of the principal objections to a multi-unit division organization centers around "span of control." Limitations, both human and communications, imposed by having too many major units controlled and coordinated by a single headquarters could be severe and even critical. Under the proposed concept this would be overcome, *when necessary,* by forming a provisional brigade-type headquarters from division headquarters. There are enough people and radios to staff and equip a *small* tactical headquarters. On short notice, this could control two or more MLTs as well as combat support units when terrain or the situation required. Such a provisional command group would be a tactical headquarters only when operating under division control. Once the need for an intermediate headquarters echelon has passed, the brigade dissolves and the people rejoin division. MLTs of the brigade then revert to division control.

Modern warfare, according to expert theory, demands operational and organizational flexibility. If this is so—and all facts plus our experience to date support this opinion—then we cannot be satisfied with a cumbersome horse-and-buggy organization. We need further development and revision of the provisional organization. The structure and concept proposed here will work. It is easily adaptable and will fit the needs of the Marine Corps now and within the foreseeable future. USMC



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
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Terror In...





This is the conclusion of an article begun last month and written prior to the Cyprus settlement reached in the London Agreement of 19 February 1959. Subsequently, Col Grivas left Cyprus for Greece; EOKA surrendered its arms; Greek Cypriost imprisoned by the British were released; emergency measures were relaxed.

The Cypriots, Greeks and Turks are working with the British to prepare for establishment of an independent Republic of Cyprus, probably early in 1960.

PART II

by Maj B. I. S. Gourlay, OBE, MC, Royal Marines

IT MUST BE STRESSED THAT THIS IS no place to advance political arguments urging the British point of view. Suffice it to say that the Cyprus problem is one of real complexity. Any plan for the island must seek to resolve a tangle of conflicting interests. To yield entirely to Greek demands is to offend all Turkish hopes, and the reverse applies. But whatever Britain already may have planned or will plan in the future, she is resolute in her determination not to give way to violence. In Cyprus she bears very special responsibilities, not least of which is the maintenance of law and order. It is upon the security forces, so called, that this stern task lies.

The term "security forces" does not mean the fighting services only, but rather a partnership with the police and all the civil agencies whose task it is to keep the peace. If there is one great lesson which Britain has learned in dealing with security problems the world over, it is that they can only be solved when the civil, police and military authorities work together in unison. In efficient security forces, there is no room for those who think that they can go it alone.

In the ensuing paragraphs we will chiefly be concerned with the military ground forces. Space does not allow us to do full justice to the part other sections of the security forces are playing. A brief account, therefore, must suffice.

Security operations in Cyprus are under the overall control of a military Director of Operations who is responsible to the Governor. He works through a combined staff on which are represented the three services, the police and the civil administration. This mixed staff is reflected in District Security Committees dotted round the island and consisting of civil, military and police representatives. They work in the closest accord and their decisions are invariably jointly taken.

The main tasks of the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force may be said briefly to consist in commanding the sea and air approaches to the island in order to prevent smuggling.

The police force, some 2,000 strong, is composed of Greek and Turkish Cypriots backed up by some 400 inspectors and sergeants from the United Kingdom police constabularies. The first contingent of the latter reached Cyprus in 1956 at the instigation of Field Marshal Harding. Their high standard of integrity and their calm performance of duty in difficult times did much to boost the shaken morale of the local force in the early days of terrorism, and continue to do so today.

The civil administration, it need hardly be said, provides all the essential experience in local affairs without which the efforts of the security forces are likely to be abortive or at best misdirected. It is impossible to think of any type of op-



British Information Services Photo

Time bombs destroyed these airliners. A delayed departure saved members of service families, mostly women and children.



Central Press Photos Ltd, London

Ski patrol, Mt. Olympus



Central Press Photos Ltd, London

Scaling Cyprus mountains


eration in which their views will not be sought on matters ranging from the protection of village water supplies to the problems of mass fingerprinting.

We can now turn to the ground forces. We have already gained a clear enough impression of the terrain in Cyprus to guess at the restrictions and difficulties which it might impose on the operation of ground troops. But there are other important restrictions to bear in mind. These are the legal ones. First there is the basic principle of English law, which applies to all British territories overseas, that when troops operate in support of the civil power they must not use any more force than is strictly necessary to achieve the immediate aim.

This is commonly known as the principle of minimum force and is one which is impressed upon the mind of every single British soldier. It carries special importance for the military because they go about their duties armed with a lethal weapon. Because military commanders can be called to account if they do not observe this principle, those in command of troops facing serious disturbances may be caught in a dilemma. If they hesitate too long in using their fire power they run a risk of being overwhelmed; if they shoot too early they stand to be court-martialled for using excessive force. It is not only the commander who faces this dilemma. The individual soldier or Marine making an arrest or surprising an intruder on military premises, to take two simple examples, has also to keep the principle in mind. But neither commander nor individual soldier is likely to go far wrong if he acts with impartiality, with preventive and not punitive intent, and in good faith.

There are occasions when troops will have no hesitation in opening fire; to take one obvious example, when they themselves come under fire. Their actions in such cases are governed by the law or special emergency regulations issued from time to time by the Governor. Emergency legislation covers such points as powers of arrest; powers of search; power to remove obstructions on the roads (if made of stones these can be used as missiles against the security forces); removal of national flags, banners and slogans from buildings; interrogation of the public; action to be taken when civilian vehicles fail to stop, and a host of other matters.

Enough has been written to make it clear that the soldier requires to know a great deal of the policeman's job in addition to his own. In his daily dealings with the public he is more policeman than soldier. He has to be cooperative and friendly; yet he knows that it is the public who shields the EOKA assassin. It is not easy for him to forget that many of his comrades have been killed on duty in the island. Taken



Central Press Photos Ltd, London

In a dawn raid Commandos search for hidden arms with mine detectors.

all in all, his task is not straightforward. It cannot be learned in a day.

When all the components of the security forces are working together as a team at every level, and how much more easily this is said than done, there will still be two requirements vital to success in counter-terrorist operations: the first is first class communications, the second, information.

When violence broke out in April 1955 in Cyprus, neither existed. For many months, while suitable equipment was being brought out from Britain and installed, operational messages had to be conveyed to all parts of the island by dispatch rider or courier and via the few insecure post office lines which existed. It was well nigh impossible to organize rapid counter-action against the terrorists in such circumstances, let alone to achieve security. The picture is now different. First class communications do exist.

The acquisition of information has not been such an easy matter. No amount of propaganda or threats will drag determined terrorists from their lairs. They have to be sought out and destroyed. But to be successful in this we must have information; yet without success we get no information. This is a vicious circle and one which had to be broken during the second half of 1955 while the build-up of troops and equipment was going on. It was many months before useful information began to come into the hands of the security forces. In the early spring of 1956, the pattern of EOKA's organization gradually began to take shape, largely as a result of numerous small successes. Weeks of patient patrolling, road checks, brushes with the town groups and mountain gangs, and a lucky break from time to time, put the security forces into a position to launch large scale offensive operations.

By July of the same year, several of the mountain gangs had been eliminated. Then the Suez crisis intervened and the formations most concerned with operations in the mountains, 3rd Commando Brigade, Royal Marines and the Parachute Brigade were diverted to other tasks. The story thereafter is one of lulls and truces, mostly occurring after major EOKA set-backs, and of renewed offensives culminating in the security forces' successes during the latter months of 1958.

In November of that year, Kyriakos Matsis, ambush expert and the most sought for EOKA leader after Grivas, was surprised in a village in the north of the island and killed.

The story of his discovery throws light on the problems attending searches of mountain villages. Such a story usually starts with the receipt of information about the whereabouts of a gang or individual terrorist leader. More often than not this will lead to the cordoning and searching of a house, a village, several villages or even a large tract of countryside. An operation of this sort must achieve surprise to succeed. If the greatest care is not taken, the birds will have flown by the time the cordon is in position. As soon as troops leave their camps, their strength, composition and direction of movement will reach unfriendly ears. The employment of helicopters can and does help to overcome this problem, but for large operations great numbers of them are required. Even in administrative matters it will be necessary to resort to deception if operational intentions are not to be given away. For example, heavy demands on base stores before protracted operations may result in a noticeable increase of administrative traffic. This, in turn, may reveal that something big is afoot. Further, it may help EOKA to deduce what units are involved.

Once the cordon is in position, (troops in the order of hundreds may be needed for this task), it is for other ground forces to conduct the search. In default of pinpoint information, this process is likely to be a long one, measured in weeks or even months. The wanted men will clearly not be walking about openly in the hills and villages. They will be out of the way, in hideouts. The location of these hideouts will be de-


termined by factors such as ease of concealment, accessibility, escape routes and so on. A less obvious factor will be the need to be within reasonable distance of sources of food, water and ammunition.

Most hideouts are therefore found either in a village or a mile or two away from one. Matsis had elected to stay in the little village of Kato Dhikomo when news reached him of the big security drive in the Kyrenia range. His discovery, so typical of similar successes in previous operations, came about to some extent by chance. The house in which he lay hidden came under search for arms. The search looked to be unsuccessful. As a soldier was having a last nose around, he used his bayonet to prod the tiled floor of the back parlor. In testing the cement between two tiles, his bayonet went straight through and into what transpired to be the entrance to a ready-use or emergency hideout.

Matsis and two others were crouched below the floor in a hole six feet long, four feet wide and two feet deep. His companions chose to give themselves up. Matsis, resisting every persuasion to follow suit, eventually killed himself with an automatic weapon.

It must not be thought though that all mountain operations take the form of large-scale sweeps and searches. The infiltration of small patrols, the posting of observers, ambush parties and the like have achieved striking successes. The particular advantages of the small party are that it can be introduced into an area surreptitiously and that, once established, it does not excite the attention which the mass movement of troops inevitably does. The apparent absence of troops in an area will tend to lull the resident gangs, their supply parties and couriers into a false sense of security, and may induce carelessness on their part. It is under these conditions that the security patrol may surprise a gang on the move, capture couriers with important documents, or stumble across the cigarette packet which provides vital evidence of a nearby hideout.

All hideouts are not so modest as the one in which Matsis met his death. His was essentially of a type designed to provide temporary cover during surprise search operations.



British Information Services Photo

Boarding party searches Greek-Cypriot fishing boat.

The more elaborate hideout is built to house several men, and is stocked with every requirement for a long stay.

Before concluding these brief comments on mountain operations, mention must be made of informers. An integral part of any search is the screening of every man and woman within the cordon. This process involves their passing before a team of police interrogators furnished with the details of wanted persons. The work of these interrogators can be greatly enhanced if they are supported by an ex-terrorist who, in order to save his neck, is prepared to pick out EOKA members. This man is commonly hidden behind a screen as the villagers file past and so retains his incognito. Whole village gangs have been identified in this way.

We have now learned something of mountain operations. What goes on in the towns? The chief problems here are those of dealing with the gunman, dispersing unlawful assemblies and suppressing riots.

Some indication of the advantages which gunmen enjoy in the crowded narrow streets has already been given. An effective counter to the ruthless killer is not easy to find. To fill the streets with armed soldiery is exorbitantly expensive in manpower and can only be maintained for short periods. Snap searches of male passers-by in the hope of catching the terrorist with a weapon on his person may have some deterrent effect. So also may the arming of British civilians, the use of decoys and other methods of deception. But it will only be a matter of time before a patient killer will find a safe opportunity to shoot. Special EOKA surveillance parties keep a check on the movements of prospective victims, and when a daily or weekly pattern is established, choose the most propitious moment for the deed.

The dispersal of unlawful assemblies and the suppression of riots present the security forces with thoroughly unpleasant and thankless tasks. A great many photographs have appeared since 1955, and especially in the anti-British press, of ugly riot scenes in Cyprus. It is well to remember that the quelling of disturbances is a difficult business; it requires from commanders nice judgement and a sense of timing, and from everyone at every level, a cool head and self-restraint in the face of severe provocation and personal danger.

How does the commander of troops go about the problem of crowd clearance? Standard British military doctrine lays down that it is the police who are responsible in the first place for dealing with unruly crowds; that when the police find the task too much for them they receive the aid of the military. In

Cyprus it has been necessary to depart from this procedure owing to the numerical inferiority of the police. As a result, troops are trained to use police methods in controlling crowds. They are no longer strangers to the baton and shield.

When a hostile crowd forms then, it will probably first clash with the police or troops acting as policemen. It will also probably find across its path, a thin concertina barbed wire barrier or other hastily erected barrier. Its more enterprising elements will then try to find the flanks of the police who in turn will use reserve forces to seal off the crowd's movements. The police will try every nonviolent means to disperse the crowd: loudspeaker announcements, written exhortations on large banners, the reading of a proclamation and warning to disperse, even the production of cameras to photograph ring-leaders and colored dye-sprayers to assist subsequent identifications.

Assuming these measures fail, the throwing of bottles and stones by rowdies will start about now. These will be aimed as much from the tops of nearby houses as from ground level. They will hurt. Even a small bottle thrown from a height or hurled at short range can cause unpleasant damage to the unprotected face. After the bottles and the stones may come the first "bomb," usually made from water piping of about three-inch diameter, filled with explosive and sealed off at the ends. By the time this happens the stage is set for stern countermeasures.

Before considering these measures which culminate in the opening of fire by the military, it would be well to mention that all crowds do not necessarily reach a really violent state. Many disperse before the bomb-throwing stage is reached. School children, for example, stage many demonstrations which for the most part do not feature bomb-throwing. But nonetheless they can be awkward to handle. Provoked by EOKA leaflets they will stream from school, girls as well as boys. In a leaflet addressed to school children, Grivas once told them that the cause of ENOSIS was "more sacred than your teachers, your mother or your father." A likely occasion on which they will appear is the funeral of an ex-terrorist. Turning up in their hundreds, chanting slogans and becoming more unruly as they go, they can often only be dispersed by the use of tear gas and physical manhandling. The snatching of the leaders, often youths and girls in their teens (all of equal truculence), and locking them up out of harm's way for a few hours often has a salutary effect on these youthful gatherings.

But to return to the riotous crowd. The bomb has been thrown and we have on our hands a serious breach of the peace. The police, or troops acting as such, will now, if they have not already done so, embark on a series of baton charges. If the wind is right they may employ tear smoke delivered in hand grenade form or shot from longer range riot guns. If troops are handy, the bayonet may have been resorted to, though this weapon has its disadvantages in that the user may become too closely embroiled with the crowd. If all these measures fail, if more bombs are thrown or buildings are set on fire, and the crowd still will not disperse, the moment arrives to use the ultimate means of forcing the issue, the bullet. We have now to go more than ever carefully.



The first requirement before opening fire is for the military commander on the spot to be quite satisfied that no other course is open to him to achieve the immediate aim of restoring law and order. The next is to give the crowd a clear warning that they will be fired upon if they do not disperse. They must be then given the opportunity to move off. If and when fire is eventually opened, it is carefully controlled: two bullets must not be used if one will suffice. Fire will be directed at those actually perpetrating the violence. Shots must not be placed over the heads of the crowd as this serves only to panic the less hardy members and an ugly scramble to escape may lead to casualties from trampling underfoot. Throughout, action must be aimed to prevent further trouble and not to hand out wholesale punishment.

When these stern and distasteful measures succeed, as succeed they will, immediately steps are taken to succor the wounded on both sides. Arrested men will be handed over to the police. The scene will return to normal, though it may be, as often happens on these occasions, that a curfew is now imposed to prevent further crowds forming and to allow tempers to cool.

The important thing to remember in this type of operation, as with all others in this troubled island, is that the armed forces act in support of the civil power in order to restore law and order. Military measures alone cannot solve the Cyprus problem. What is required urgently is a political settlement, but this will not be achieved so long as the Cypriot fears to open his mouth to express his true thoughts and aspirations.

The primary objectives of the security forces are to uphold the law, eliminate the terrorists and put an end to intimidation: in sum, to create conditions for a political settlement.

The task is hard, sometimes dangerous, often distasteful. But it must not be thought that the British serviceman looks upon all Greek Cypriots as his enemies and vice versa: witness the friendliness shown toward each other when an EOKA truce has seemingly brought operations to an end. He looks forward, as all fair-minded Britons and Cypriots must do, to the day when he can resume the old, long established friendships.

When that day comes, another struggle of a different sort will begin, a struggle to undo the damage which has been wrought in the mind of Greek Cypriot youth. Damage exemplified in the following remark said to have been made by a schoolboy under interrogation, in the course of denying responsibility for a bomb incident: *"I am only in the fourth form. You learn bomb throwing in the fifth!"*

When that day comes and when that struggle starts . . . Ah! But that will be another story. USMC

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SUPPORT BY FIRE

PART THREE

CLOSE AIR SUPPORT: QUO VADIS?

By LtCol T. N. Greene



"Before D-Day there weren't any tech manuals on How to Dive-Bomb a Bridge or How to Pinpoint an 88. Pilots learned the hard way.

". . . Toughest problem was working with the man on the ground. At St. Lô, ground officers directed fighter bombers. They didn't know how close a P-47 or P-38 could come to the line without hitting U. S. troops. They didn't know whether to strafe or bomb a position. But they did know they had a tremendous striking force at their disposal."

—ACHTUNG JABOS: *The Story of the IX TAC, I&E Div. Special and Information Services, ETO-USA, 1945.*

"The (Air Force board observing the Leyte Operation) reported that Navy and Marine pilots consistently bombed within 250 yards of friendly troops and occasionally knocked out enemy strong points inside friendly positions without accident to the troops they were supporting. It reasoned that these excellent, and consistent, results were the fruit of training ground forces and air forces together, and holding rehearsal in which the actual units which were to work together on the battlefield took part."

—MARSHALL ANDREWS, *Disaster Through Airpower, Rinehart, 1950.*

WE'VE GOT IT. NOW WHAT DO WE do with it?

More and more that is the urgent question in an FSCC as jet aircraft report on station for close air support and begin guzzling fuel at an alarming rate. The hard facts of the problem are these:

1) Fuel supply is good for one hour, more or less.
2) Unless both pilot and FAC are experts, it takes about one half hour to brief, identify the target, and complete the strike.
3) The absolute minimum time to impose a restrictive fire plan which will be binding on force artillery and naval gunfire connected only by radio is 20 minutes. The message must be written, transmitted, relayed by other radios, and plotted.
4) This leaves about 10 minutes to transmit a complete air request, roger for it, check it for safety, decide on a restrictive fire plan in the FSCC and give the DASC a thumbs-up on the mission. (In close air support, silence is supposed to mean consent — at division level it may well mean the transmission was not heard. In any case, the restrictive plan has to be confirmed.)

The above picture is obviously not the sort of orderly procedure envisioned in the staff manual wherein commanders and G-3s calmly assess relative priorities of supporting arms effort. An alternative is to stack up requests, complete with pre-imposed restrictive fire plans, awaiting the arrival of air. This results in considerable periods of time during which other supporting arms sit on their hands, but their plight is not the point of this discussion.

The point is that restrictive fire plans do very little to protect jet aircraft from a negligible danger. They handcuff the close air support weapon as much or more than any other arm. If the air-ground team is to function with increased effectiveness, or even the effectiveness it had back in WWII, we must strike off these shackles and use a flexible arm in a flexible way. Here are some methods of reducing or eliminating restrictive fire plans which are exercise-tested:

For deep air support we draw the bomb line. Beyond this line air is free to attack anything that moves. It would seem desirable then to pull the bomb line in as close to the troops as we dare from the standpoint of safety of troops and activities of other arms. But wait. Any air can work beyond the bomb line, not just our assigned and specially-trained Marine or Navy groups. Theater air, even SAC, may be assigned to enter the objective area. Also, reconnaissance units may operate well inland. In any amphibious operation, naval gunfire may be operating far up the coast. It is clear that we have in the amphibious objective area plenty of space in which no coordination of air with surface forces is required, but it is equally clear that on the near fringe there appears a gray area where a minimal amount of coordination is required. These two areas can be separated by reviving a term similar to the meaning of the Forward Bomb Line. The abbreviation (FBL) is too much like that of Force Beachhead Line (FBHL) for convenience.

Moving back to the beaches we now reach the area where true close air support begins and detailed coordination is required with the fire and movement of surface forces. The old term Tactical Bomb Line (TBL) might well be preserved to mark this boundary. Now comes the pitfall for ground planners, especially where deep helicopter operations or shore-to-shore landings are involved. The thought occurs, why not just tuck the TBL around our isolated unit and let air worry about the interval between? This is a worthy cause, that of freeing air to do its job with the minimum of hindrance. However, this is an area of deep and legitimate concern to the surface forces. Future juncture operations are being planned here; G-2 needs to know more; reconnaissance may be required. Movement into the area will require frequent changes to the line, not the easiest thing to change and disseminate rapidly. Enemy forces in the area are a threat, not only in the daytime and good weather, but all the time, thus long-range surface fires may be required. We have here an area in which a small, but significant amount of coordination may be required. It should not be placed outside the TBL. Nor is there any need to do so. The Direct Air Support Center (DASC) supported by its subordinate Air Support Radar Teams (ASRT) is fully capable of briefing missions and strikes of various kinds in this area, or even controlling them by radar, when required.

The targets for such strikes, it should be noted, are discovered by (or at least for) the Division G-2, priorities of air support in support of the division and priorities of target attack remain the prerogative of the division commander (G-3 staff cognizance) and are given to the





DASC by the Division Air Officer after being coordinated as required in the FSCC. The DASC (which belongs to the Air Wing Commander) executes the strike and reports back results in the same way that artillery or naval gunfire controlled by higher authority and made available to the division would. How in this procedure do we avoid restrictive fire plans? One way is to draw inside the TBL air kill zones into which artillery and naval gunfire will not fire without special permission. Another way is to create purely mental air kill zones by scheduling air in one part at a time when you schedule artillery and naval gunfire elsewhere. Still another way, useful at night, is to separate by altitude—making radar controlled drops from an altitude determined to be above the maximum ordinate of surface trajectories. One more equally valid solution in view of the marginal danger to jets from surface gunfire is to simply notify the DASC in advance of any planned intense artillery concentrations. This is the reverse of a restrictive fire plan — a restrictive air plan. Any of these solutions represents an orderly approach to the problem whereby the DASC can be given a list of targets, damage desired and priorities, and can then properly schedule aircraft and armament with minimum restrictions.


The requirements for and the nature of fire support coordination, as well as a number of other functions, to be accomplished by the Landing Force of a one-division, one-air wing force are not yet entirely clear. One possible approach is to employ a very similar system. The wing staff must obviously plan and execute air defense and counter-air operations if the Amphibious Task Force commander ever passes them ashore. The Landing Force staff could provide to the Tactical Air Control Center (TACC) similar lists of targets, damage desired, and priorities. Obviously, the Landing Force commander must also assign the relative priorities of air effort to the requirements established by the division, the wing, and his own staff. It appears that the Landing Force will more logically concern itself with keeping reinforcements off the back of the division than with close supervision of either the division or the wing—this for the reason that there is no one else to do the job. The task cannot be handed exclusively to air, unless air is given additional tools for the job such as the Force Reconnaissance Battalion, extra help in the G-2 section, and so on. Certainly, the Landing Force must particularly concern itself with the grey area between the FBL and the TBL, the area in which some surface fires may be available, in which reconnaissance will logically operate, and, above all, in which approaching enemy reinforcements become matters of prime concern.

Let's move now well inside the TBL and inside the No-Fire Line (NFL). This is an artillery-naval gunfire control measure which has no official meaning for air. To artillery and naval gunfire it means this is the point at which fires must be coordinated and controlled by the RLT or BLT commander concerned. It can well mean about the same to air: this is the point at which a TACP or ASRT must control the strike, or, if a Tactical Air Coordinator (Airborne) (TAC (A)) is required, one who has been very carefully briefed. In this area what are the requirements for restrictive fire plans for jet aircraft? As discussed in previous articles, the trend

must be to decentralization of fire control and coordination. Certainly at the RLT FSCC, probably at the BLT FSCC, the commander and staff are well aware of all major surface firings. They decide to use air on a target. They know why they want it, what else is going on, and what, if anything, they will lose by using air. There is no need to go through the long, involved process described previously for imposing a restrictive fire plan. The appropriate air liaison officer sets up the strike and the artillery and naval gunfire representatives simply tell units which endanger the strike to cease fire. There is no plotting to do, no decryption, no delay. Of course, this does not stop all trajectories in the area, since some deep fires not under control of the unit may be passing through but the risk is infinitesimal to a jet. Korean experience showed that rather than ceasing fire for an air strike, it may be preferable to schedule special flak suppression fires by ground weapons to assure the strike success.



Lest we of the ground forget, the helicopter is an aircraft. To a helicopter pilot flying low and slow (or to a transport making an air resupply run) surface fires are of considerably more concern and a restrictive fire plan of more comfort. Considering the number of odd jobs the choppers do, placing restrictive fire plans on all runs could well tie up both the DASC and the FSCC from any other useful work. A simple expedient is to prepare in advance of an operation a complete helicopter airways system overlay. This is published to all air and fire support units. By comparing it to artillery and naval gunfire firing positions and fire capabilities periodically obtained by the DASC from the FSCC, any helicopter mission can be quickly briefed on safe routes and altitudes. If a restrictive fire plan should be required, it can be placed rapidly in effect by reference to the proper route designation. Transports and VMO can also benefit from the system.



Everything discussed so far can be best executed if the division FSCC and the DASC are side by side in the CP. At least two RLT/MAG and one division/wing LEX have indicated that the DASC should be

with the regiment or division and the TACC with the brigade or corps headquarters. The place of the DASC in a two-division, shoulder-to-shoulder operation might be argued, but separation between divisions would almost certainly require that the supporting wing organization provide two DASCs. We now have the same number of DASCs as we have divisions, and there is some evidence that we bought them for the exact purpose of supporting those divisions. If this is so, and the best place for the DASC is close aboard the FSCC and operations center, a slight reorganization is indicated. The DASC as presently constituted is an anachronism. Here we have a reorganized division with primary and secondary command posts which displace by leap-frogging. Supporting this is a DASC which displaces by the old system of echelonment. It seems fairly clear that what is immediately required is a primary - secondary DASC system. This would give a much more realistic capability for control to the division secondary CP.




However, this is only the immediate problem. The battlefield continues to grow. RLTs are taking more and more of the fire support control and coordination which used to be done at division. The day is rapidly approaching when they must decentralize more to BLT level. We should now carefully consider whether in a few years we may not require a modest DASC capability at the RLT level, as a subordinate echelon and relay station of the one at division. The question, as usual, is how can we afford it. One approach to the problem might well be to consider whether or not the personnel and communications now committed into a ratio of three ASRT, three Counter - Air Operations Centers (CAOC), and three RLT TACP per division/wing might not be consolidated. There are several difficulties apparent: function, displacement capability, terrain sensitivity, and command relationships. The RLT CP is fast becoming as terrain sensitive as the radars. Improved mobility is in sight for the air components. Remotes and relays are being improved. Further, the RLT may soon have available an anti-aircraft capability which will compel air defense coordination at this level. The ultimate requirement which indicates a need for a limited DASC at RLT is, as aviation readers have probably suspected, the problem of control of helicopter landings. Control at too high a level can have no effect except to hamper the flexibility which is the significant characteristic of the helicopter-borne force. High level control may be acceptable in landing a full RLT, less so with a BLT, but it does not at all encourage the landings of companies and platoons, which could have equal tactical benefits at lower levels.

Please note that the control of a small helicopter movement by an agency of an air control system located conveniently to an RLT CP is not at all connected with questions as to whether helicopter units shall be attached, in direct support, or any other command relationship. It refers only to the limitations of communications and the requirements for close air-ground planning of air-ground operations at the appropriate level for convenience of execution. Until such a time as the RLT might have a sub-DASC, a situation which favors RLT control of a helicopter-landed BLT can be jury-rigged by placing the displacement echelon of the DASC temporarily with that RLT.

As indicated in a previous article, the purpose of this series is not to trample on anyone's command prerogatives. From the foxhole it appears that there is plenty of room in the modern objective area for all hands to do a job. I, for one, have neither a desire to take over any proper aviation functions nor to pass to aviation any proper ground functions which I may find onerous. The aim of suggestions offered is to draw logical lines of authority and coordination to solve the problems we face. As a division FSCC habitué, I want the DASC types close by because they invariably know their job, give quick and competent advice, and are a pleasure to do business with. Having such trust and confidence in them, I feel that further continued close contact between air and ground may eventually help spread around the word that fuel-gulping close air support on air alert, as opposed to strip or deck alert, is not necessarily the answer to all air problems. We may get that point of view across yet, but you can bet your boondockers the ground types will long remember with deep affection that reliable air support on station.

Marines know for sure that they have "a tremendous striking force at their disposal." They know, too, that we can expect future "excellent, and consistent, results" as the result of training together, working together, and thinking together.

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
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★ INTRODUCTION ★



By MajGen D. M. Weller

IN DECEMBER OF 1956, I WAS FORtunate enough to be one of the staff designated to accompany Deputy Commander in Chief, European Command, Gen George Decker, USA, to the winter maneuvers of the Pakistan Army. After a long flight with an overnight stopover at Adana, Turkey, we landed at Karachi. Our arrival in Karachi coincided with that of a battalion of Marines from Japan who were maneuvering in the Indian Ocean—a rather graphic demonstration of the strategic mobility of the Navy-Marine Corps combination. The military appearance of the Marines was a source of pride to us.

A 600-mile flight to the northeast corner of West Pakistan brought us to the maneuver area. During the flight we could see that the terrain was flat, cut by slow-flowing rivers with a series of dams and canals to conserve and tap the water so vital to the country's agriculture. To the northeast we could see the towering mountains of Kashmir, while to the west lay the famous Northwest Frontier which Kipling immortalized.

The headquarters for the exercise lay in a charming spot in the angle between a river and a canal. We were assigned large pyramidal tents of heavy double wall construction which proved to be well insulated against the cold. I was assigned an orderly, a youngster of about 15, one of the Pakistan Army's Boys—orphaned youngsters who are brought into the Army and trained prior to their entrance into the regular Army. He was a bright boy who spoke good English. I am afraid that I disappointed the lad because I only took one bath in the large galvanized tub—but in those temperatures, one was enough in our three-day stay.

In addition to the US delegation, there were observers from Iran, Iraq, Turkey, Indonesia, Thailand, and the UK.

We were briefed on the exercise by Gen Mohammed Ayub Khan, CinC of the Pakistan Army, a most impressive officer in all respects. In the bizarre setting of a tent pavilion, lined with Pakistan rugs of beautiful color and design, he outlined the objective for the Corps of one armored and two infantry divisions. He illustrated the maneuver on a sand table. Described in the clipped British accent, this all contributed to a rather unusual personal experience. (Particularly as we are aware that Gen Ayub Khan has now assumed the conduct of his country's affairs.)

Regardless of the surroundings, there was nothing unorthodox about the tactics; they made military common sense.

Early the next morning I set out to visit as many units as possible—I was assigned LtCol Khan, as a guide. He had spent WWII fighting the Japanese in Burma and, like all the officers assigned to the observers, was top-notch. (It was from him I learned how, in the days following the partition of British India, the Pakistan elements of the Indian Army banded themselves together to cover the movement of the people into this newly created country—and that the confidence and trust of the population in their Army was everywhere apparent.) As a "cannon cocker," I naturally gravitated to an artillery unit—a medium outfit—in position in an open field with camouflage. The mediums were well dispersed, excellently dug in, and effective use was made of camouflage nets. The battery officers all spoke English. It was clear that those officers had a thorough knowledge of their business. The battery commander put one of his gun crews through standing gun drill with dummy projectiles and their precision was something to see. Here was the first of a series of impressions of the competence of the officers and enlisted.

Visits to Division Headquarters and Division Artillery Headquarters added to the growing realization that the Pakistan officers were thorough professionals. Their staff organization follows the British pattern. Staff officers were handling a harassing situation with effectiveness—aided in the flat terrain by the reconnaissance reports from OE type aircraft. The Division Artillery Headquarters, after detailed questions, showed consideration of all problems, including ammunition supply—one likely to be overlooked in maneuvers.

Our next stop was at one of the Battalion Headquarters which was operating from a well-camouflaged van. Here the first flaw showed up—a lack of depth in the operation center where a harried major was working hard to get the details of the impending river crossing worked out.

Throughout the day our trek had covered much country — passing through villages in sharp contrast to modern Karachi—villages which appeared to have undergone few changes in hundreds of years. On all sides it was apparent that Pakistan people held the Army in high regard.

After an excellent buffet at the Headquarters mess, LtCol Khan and I set out shortly before sunset to join one of the battalions making a night river-crossing. We managed to get lost just at dark, but finally caught up with our battalion, which by this time was on the march to the site chosen for the crossing. We then left

our jeep and fell in at the rear of the last company.

The movement of the column was made in absolute quiet—there was no talking except for orders given in a very low tone. The route intersections were well marked by route markers and there was no slackening of the pace.

After about 30 minutes of marching, we reached the selected point for the river crossing. Our company then broke into squad-column formation—again in absolute quiet, without lights and confusion. In the meantime, the company commander received word through battalion by radio that friendly patrols had found the far bank clear of the enemy.

Engineer units brought plywood boats forward to the squad positions. Then, again in absolute quiet, designated members of the squad picked up the boat and moved to the canal bank. Here the squad, working smoothly, launched the boat, embarked, and took up prescribed positions with paddles ready. Then on synchronized watch time, the platoon leader set his boat in motion followed almost simultaneously by the remainder of the platoons. In spite of rather swift current, the boats made the 300-foot crossing in good order—and were subsequently returned by a small crew for additional troops. After several trips, all elements of the battalion had completed the crossing.

Here was a small unit exercise executed by a superbly conditioned and disciplined group of professionals—soldiers like my jeep driver who as a corporal was approaching his 12th year of service. (He had fought in the jungles of Burma against the Japanese.) Nor was this effectiveness limited to the lower ranks, for at every level of staff and command, the same competence was exhibited—a competence based on high intelligence combined with experience and thorough professional training. Truly, the Pakistan Army units are the sort Marines would welcome on their flanks.

Before my departure from Pakistan, I told MajGen Ahmad, the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army, that I felt the MARINE CORPS GAZETTE would like an article on the Army. This was done and follows:

THE PAKISTAN ARMY

By LtGen H. I. Ahmad

IN THE DEFENSE SET-UP OF PAKISTAN, THE ARMY, BECAUSE of its size and role, stands senior to the other two services, the Navy and the Air Force. In order to understand this Army, it is necessary to keep in view the Administration and Organization of the British Army. Because of its long association, the same pattern has emerged, the same rank structure, the same chain of command and almost the same training methods. Recently, however, certain important modifications have been made to bring the Pakistan Army in line with the requirements for US military aid.

This Army which now guards the frontiers of Pakistan is in many ways unique. Although its birth dates back only ten years, it is built around a core of seasoned soldiers who have long and distinguished records of campaign service.



Gen George C. Decker, USA, (left), and Gen Mohammed Ayub Khan, Comander in Chief of the Pakistan Army



At Kakul, Pakistan Military Academy cadets parade at graduation

Organization

On the eve of independence on 14 August 1947, the country as its share of partition, inherited only depleted divisions and a series of gaps in training institutions. The reconstitution of the Army was, therefore, immediately undertaken. As the first step, the General Headquarters was set up in Rawalpindi, where the Northern Command Headquarters of the British Army used to exist. But it took months of strenuous effort before a workable shape could be given to the Pakistan Army and new training controls, new regiments and new formations could be planned and brought into being.


The officers who were entrusted with this task were young in years, in comparison to those who in normal times shoulder such service responsibilities, but it will always stand to their credit and their devotion to duty that through hard work they equipped themselves to meet the problems that confronted them, and made this Army into a balanced and effective force.

Training

The Pakistan Army consists of long service soldiers to the majority of whom the Army is a family tradition. There is no conscription in the country and there is no need for one. It is an Army of volunteers. The men join a regimental training center of their choice and after 20 weeks of hard and intensive work, but rewarding training, they are drafted to active units. In their units, then, they perfect their soldiering and learn their profession. In due course of time those who have qualified will be promoted as noncommissioned officers and stand in line with those who may, if they pass all their tests, one day attain commissioned rank.


Those who are chosen for officer cadre, and that includes direct entrants, start with a course of two and a half years at the Pakistan Military Academy which was set up in 1948 at Kakul, a hill station in the northwestern area of the country. Four terms spread over two years is the length of the course at the Academy. The curriculum is modeled on the modern lines of half military and half academic subjects.

On graduating successfully from the Military Academy an officer joins his unit and goes through constant and progressive training in his unit as well as in various Army schools of instruction. Some of the important Army Schools of Instruction are: School of Artillery, Nowshera; Army School of Signals, Rawalpindi; Army School of Administration,






Pakistan soldiers undergo progressive training at the Armored Corps School and Artillery School in Nowshera



Murree; Infantry School, Quetta; Armored Corps School, Nowshera; and School of Military Engineering, Risalpur.

The highest military training institution in Pakistan is the Staff College at Quetta. Established over 50 years ago to meet the growing need for staff-trained officers of the old Indian Army, this institution has improved and developed with the years. It can boast of a history, traditions and achievements which no other institution in Pakistan can equal. In the half century of its existence the College has trained over 2,000 staff officers. Of these, four have attained the rank of Field Marshal, and 114 have risen to be General Officers. Field Marshals Deverel, Blamey (Australia), Auchinleck and Slim have passed through this institution as students, and so have Generals Lord Ismay, Cassels,


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EAST PAKISTAN
NARBADA R.
CALCUTTA
INDIA
BOMBAY
GODAVARI R.
BAY OF BENGAL
ARABIAN SEA
KISTNA R.
CEYLON
MILES 100 0 100 200 300
KILOMETERS 100 0 100 200 300



Wide World Photos

Pakistan Army is wholly an army of volunteers

Hartley, Lord Gowrie and Air Marshal Lloyd. The present Commander-in-Chief of the Iraq Army, Gen Rafiq Arif, is also a product of this college. Distinguished soldiers like Field Marshals Montgomery and Massingbird have been here as instructors. The complete list of those who have achieved equal distinction will fill many pages.

The College today performs two distinct functions. Firstly, it trains officers of about 10-12 years service to perform numerous duties on the staff of various Army formations, and imparts instruction in the art of war at higher levels. It is from amongst these staff trained officers that the bulk of the senior commanders and senior staff officers have been drawn in the past. This will continue to be the case in the future. The duration of these courses is ten months, and each course contains eight to ten students from the armies of Allied countries. Since independence, this institution has trained officers from Australia, Canada, Egypt, France, Iran, Iraq, Turkey, United Kingdom and United States. This provides an indication of the high quality of instruction and of the final product. The instruction provides, apart from other things, a study of future developments in weapons and equipment and their effect on present day tactics and organizations.

The College celebrated its golden jubilee in 1955.

Training of personnel is not confined to these schools of instruction only. From time to time both officers and men are also sent to foreign countries including the United States of America for advanced training in military, scientific and staff subjects. In a number of cases, during their training abroad, our officers and men have shown commendable results and earned appreciation for their professional ability and general behavior from their instructional staff as well as from the fellow trainees from other countries.

During winter every year large scale field exercises are held in which all ranks take part. Some of these maneuvers are also attended by Army observers and military experts of various friendly countries. Recently, in December 1956, particular study of the various phases of nuclear warfare was made by men and commanders at all levels during the course of a specially designed battle exercise. This exercise was attended by senior military observers from the US, UK, Turkey, Indonesia, Thailand, Ceylon, Iraq and Iran.

These maneuvers were conducted as a joint Army/Air exercise under the direction of the two Commanders-in-Chief, working through a joint headquarters at which Army and Air Force officers worked side by side.

Equipment

Our equipment position has steadily improved and is being progressively bettered with the cooperation and assistance of our foreign friends and allies, particularly and mainly the United States of America. Our soldiers have quickly and very efficiently learned to handle the equipment we have already received. Their ability to handle more technical and greater numbers and varieties of modern weapons is remarkable.

The development of Defense Science in the country is being looked after by an Army Scientific Advisory Council which was formed in December 1955 when a conference of scientists, industrialists and educationists met at Rawalpindi to plan out a program for scientific invention and research directed towards the production of improved weapons, better techniques, abler men and new doctrines. The Commander-in-Chief, General Mohd Ayub Khan, HJ, in his address to the country's scientists, educationists and industrialists who participated in the deliberations of the Army Scientific Advisory Committee said, "You are to suggest ways, we will try and provide the means." It is the aim of the Army Scientific Advisory Council to find ways and means of utilizing the existing scientific potential of the country for defense needs.

The recently constructed Ordnance Factories at Wah, near Rawalpindi have already started providing the required amount of small arms and ammunition. The factories are in a position to manufacture the small arms and ammunition for not only the local consumption but also for foreign markets.

Seen in the context of the country's resources, the achievement of the Pakistan Army during these ten years of independence is very heartening. Today it is a modern, fully trained and well equipped defense force, guarding the frontiers of this infant state, and is ready to undertake greater responsibilities. USMC

THE FUTURE BREED

By Capt Theodore K. Thomas



WRITING ABOUT FUTURE WAR HAS become one of the foremost occupations of American journalists, to judge from a survey of any given week's output of newspapers, periodicals and Sunday supplements. However, the main emphasis in this type of educated guesswork is on the glamour weapons of the moment: the nuclear devices and their components; the missiles; the very high performance aircraft and rocket planes; the atomic submarines; and a host of complex electronic marvels. The character of the men who are to fight these weapons is largely ignored. It is rather assumed that they will always be there, like the duty fireman and the desk sergeant in the police precinct office, ready on station to handle whatever comes up.

Perhaps this assumption is a good indication that all is as it should be. Yet, in the face of the stupefying multiplicity of cliches that mark these superficial dissertations on military destiny, it is important to realize that changes occur in the make-up of the men of the military service, as well as in the weapons they will use. It is useful therefore from time to time to examine the temperaments and attitudes of American soldiery. With that in mind, let us look at the future of the US Marine.

. . . with drilled shoulders and a bone-deep sunburn, and a tolerant scorn of nearly everything on earth . . . . regarding the service as home and war as an occupation.

—and a Few Marines
Col J. W. Thomason, Jr. Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958

We who have participated in, and in our own small way contributed to, the making of Marine Corps history, naturally consider with pride the accomplishments of our Corps. Reflective reminiscence, however, sometimes becomes a dangerous trap for sentimentality. Remembering that, we can begin by sketching a composite picture of what we might consider to be the "Ideal Marine."

He stands tall. He wears his uniform well, and it is neat and clean-cut. His physical build is that of an athlete, in the sense that he is a man used to action. There is no excess flesh upon him, for he preserves a balanced self-discipline about his necessities and his indulgences, and would much rather feel good at any given time than to be caught overdrawn on his physical capabilities. On liberty he draws a deep line between prankishness and prudence. He will take his fun where he finds it, but he will always be found standing steady at the muster.

His mind picks things up quickly, but it is not overburdened with knowledge which he cannot capably put to use. His imagination is active on the job, but only to a point, since he has no use for daydreams, and he will quickly give the lie to rumor and overstatement. He does not *wish* too hard, and the civilian swirl of high-pressure commercialism which he encounters in off-duty moments attracts from him only a studied indifference. He puts his faith in his weapons and his leaders and the unwritten codes of justice and understanding which have existed among men-at-arms since be-

fore the Roman Legions took the field.

On a point of issue with his superiors he does not waste time brooding, but makes his feelings known, and the reasons for those feelings insofar as he himself knows them. He recognizes true and capable leaders, and to those men he gives his head and his heart, but incompetence brings out of him only a hardened and silent compliance, for above all he reveres the code of his military life, and there is no fatalistic blindness in his obedience.

Upon his sleeves he wears the stripes of an NCO, for he does not shirk responsibility, although he does not seek it overactively. He is ambitious, however, in a resolute and well-paced manner, for he knows within himself what his own capabilities are; what he can accomplish and what he cannot accomplish.

His faults, for he possesses his share, are those of men generally, but he is more aware of them than most. He rarely makes a mistake twice, for he dislikes making a mistake intensely. Instead of berating himself and others for mistakes, however, he immediately sets about planning his future avoidance of them.

He likes the Marine Corps, and its life of garrison and field, and he will stick to it, for he has reached the necessary decisions about it earlier than most men, and he feels no compelling urge to "try it on the outside," although he knows without the necessity of expressing it that he would be satisfactorily successful and happy at whatever he chose to do. He underrates himself slightly, for he is blessed with an almost complete innocence of the magnitude of his value to his country and his Corps.

The above composite sketch is perhaps as well-defined a picture of the ideal enlisted Marine as the author is capable of drawing. It comes partly from the memory of past acquaintances, both officer and enlisted, who possessed some of the same characteristics in varying degrees. It represents a type of man for whom the average commanding officer would be willing to give his eye-teeth. It also represents a type of Marine usually called the "Old Breed," from the famous descriptive passage in the writings of the late John W. Thomason, who did much to immortalize the "Old Corps."

Stands tall, uniform neat and cleancut . . . but . . . there is a looseness in his speech and in his manner . . . not found in the Old Breed.

Now it is a fact of life in the modern Marine Corps that the "Old Breed" has gone. It has gone the way of the "China Marine." This is usually regarded as unfortunate, but it is more a tragedy of sentimentality than anything else. There is always a considerable lag in time between reflective reminiscence and present reality, and the reason I sketched my composite in the present tense is that is represents what more than a few persons in the Corps today regard as a type still in existence; not in their outfit perhaps, but in some outfits they've served in or heard about. This is not to say that it is wrong to idealize, or to hold to standards of the past (provided they fit the present), but we must also have a present type for comparison purposes. Upon this relationship we can then build or project a foreseeable future.

Keeping this in mind, we can then sketch the following composite.

He still stands tall, and his uniform is still neat and clean-cut. But there is an immediate difference, and it is apparent in something about his eyes and glance and something about his bearing. There is a looseness in his speech and in his manner which was not found in the Old Breed. There is a "smartness" about his physical actions, a barely perceptible overlay of cunning.

He is alert and intelligent. He still hates to make mistakes. He learns quickly and he knows his weapons, but there is a difference in the way he handles them. The difference lies in the fact that he is not particularly careful of them. One rifle is the same as another, and there are always plenty more where that came from.

He wears battle stars, and he will reminisce of battle as easily as the next man in the company of his comrades-in-arms. But there is a difference in the way he talks about these things. The difference is due to the fact that he does not consider these matters as being a very important part of his life and existence, and he does not give them the personal flavor of, for example, the "sea stories" of the Old Corps type.



There is much of the Marine Corps life that appeals to him. He has imagination but is not given to brooding. His ties, however, his roots, are in the civilian world. This

Capt Thomas is a former Marine pilot who also served as an aviation enlisted man. Since his release from active duty in 1954 he states he has often compared the Corps as it was then with the Corps he remembers of his WWII service. His article on the Marine Corps—past and present—won for him co-first prize in the 1957 GAZETTE Essay Contest and was published under the title Privates For General Service (GAZETTE: Feb '58). In the accompanying piece Capt Thomas looks to the future.

is not to say that he cannot be induced, or cannot himself decide, to make a career in the Marine Corps, but if he does, he fully intends to carry the colors and the variegated imprints of American civilian life along with him.

He is quick to respect good leadership and just as quick to deride scornfully mistakes and incompetence on the part of his superiors. Strangely enough, there is no identifiable mark of greater or more apparent ambition in this new Marine, but money and rank are almost inseparable to him, yet with rank he is almost embarrassed by responsibility.

But above all, the new Marine talks more than his predecessors ever did. He talks with his bunkmates, with his superiors; he talks in letters to Congressmen, to his family, and to his girl. He talks about everything. He talks about battle; he talks about chow. He talks about transfer; he talks about liberty. He talks like a boot on his first leave. But he is not a boot. He is a veteran.



With all his talk, however, he does not necessarily communicate understanding any better than the Marines of a previous generation did. We regard the best of the Old Corps types as rather silent and taciturn men about most things. They didn't find it necessary to do much talking, for they had a community of military feeling and custom to which they could refer. The new Marine, however, is never quite certain exactly how he feels about military service; neither are his parents or civilian friends, and this is probably why he feels the need to talk everything out. To pursue the possible reasons for these characteristics is a quest which lies in the field of social science and behavioristic psychology and this is quite beyond the scope of this essay. We can, however, in comparing the communicative characteristics between the old and new Marine, examine some of the situations which have arisen as a result. Consider the following incident which the author witnessed in early 1942 at the Recruit Depot at San Diego.

A platoon of recruits is standing stiffly at attention, the sun glancing brightly from their new fiber sunhats. In front of the platoon paces a bull-necked DI, a "China Marine," a competent, conscientious, aggressive mentor for the deadly job of Pacific War which lies ahead. The DI is speaking and referring to previous instructions in which he had firmly outlined the necessity of wearing the fiber sunhat with its brim exactly parallel to the deck. He is silent for a moment, peering closely up and down the motionless ranks of his platoon. A fiber hat catches his eye, the brim just a shade askew. Without a word he steps to the front of the man, grasps the edges of the man's hatbrim with both hands, and brings it roughly down over the man's forehead. "I said parallel!" he snaps, stepping back.

The ranks are silent, and from the center of the forehead of the man before him the DI watches a thin trickle of blood flow down across the bridge of the nose and down the face. The DI's action had driven the inside fastening screw of the globe and anchor helmet emblem down across the man's skin in a deep scratch. The man gives no sign of pain and does not stir. The DI makes no outward sign of recognition of the accident. The afternoon's drill session continues. After the drill the man is sent to sick-bay for treatment, and the incident is forgotten.

Now compare that with the following incident, which occurred much closer to our own time. I refer to last year's nationally-publicized affair of the Marine drill instructor striking a recruit in the course of a drill session. The fact that such an incident received wide publicity and aroused a corresponding amount of public indignation could suggest to us that many changes have occurred between the character of the modern Marine and that of his predecessors. However, in drawing any conclusions we must keep in mind the general situations in which each incident took place. We should not conclude, for example, that the Marine of 1942 was actually any tougher than the Marine of 1957. He just didn't do as much talking. The recruit of 1942 entered an alien world when he took the oath of enlistment. He wanted very much to play the game, and to live up to the group's preconceived ideas of how a Marine should act. In addition, in 1942, the American public was wallowing in various states of alarm and expectation in adjusting to the idea of war. Incidents of the drill field simply didn't get much play. By 1957, the Marine Corps, as well as its sister services, was drawing its manpower from a publicity-exposed, as well as publicity-conscious, re-

serve of young men. And in these days, any involvement of the US in armed conflict receives plenty of advance publicity. Thus we see the similar acts of tough DIs arousing dissimilar results, depending not so much on the toughness of recruits from one generation to the next, but simply on their respective talkativeness.

We can now form a rather clear idea of what our "Future Breed" of Marine will be like. The Future Breed is, in fact, already here. Since demobilization in 1945-46 the major changes which will produce his attitudes and temperament have already been wrought.

This modern Marine comes from a sophisticated, highly industrialized society. This fact makes the Corps' job somewhat different, as well as more difficult. The fact that the procedures and practices involved in the division of labor among the members of that society are of greater importance to the modern recruit than to the Marine Corps leaders under which he will serve must be recognized.

By "division of labor" with reference to the Marine Corps, I mean nothing more sinister than the fact that throughout recent Marine Corps history, especially since WW II, the number of jobs or tasks, if you will, which the Corps as a whole must perform in order to accomplish its mission has steadily increased. By the same token, the number of tasks the individual Marine is expected to perform has correspondingly decreased.

The reader may readily supply numerous instances of this. The Marine aviator, for example, who was once readily qualified as fighter pilot, Officer-of-the-Deck Underway, and Platoon Leader, now is committed only to his flying job. The tasks of the Old Breed were more in line with classical soldiering and the Marine Corps of that day expected a man to be as good a truck driver, for example, as gun-captain in a shipboard secondary battery. The number of specialists required by the Corps was small and fairly constant during the years between the world wars.

In the present-day, however, the Corps is steadily evolving a multiplication of specialties. The administrative instrument used to define and categorize this division of labor is known as the Personnel Classification system, or the "MOS system" as it is sometimes termed. The PC system has produced its own evils, one of which is the fact that although a man may actually be assigned, in the course of a period of time, one or more jobs out of his MOS, his promotion is usually based on performance in his MOS number. The modern Marine is touchy about this, especially if he has any civilian background at all in one side or the other of labor-management relationships. To some officers concerned with listening to his gripes, the situation often smacks of soldiering under "union conditions." Unfortunately or not, the Corps is going to have to progress more and more under "union conditions," and the First Sergeant is going to find himself more and more performing the functions of a bargaining agent. This may be distasteful to many professional Marines, but the fact is that full cognizance and understanding of this situation is absolutely necessary to the smooth and efficient growth of the Corps. The Future Breed, in addition to being "battle wise," is going to be "labor wise."



This is going to make the line officer's job much more exacting, because the more specialized and varied the job classifications filled by the rated men under his command, the more general and broad his own knowledge and experience must be. He is fully engaged in, to borrow a term from the social scientist, "the management of violence," and he is going to manage within the framework, if not the tradition, of a labor-management type of relationship. There is no getting away from the fact that the Future Breed is going to have to be issued one hat throughout the duration of his cruise or career.

There is one more illustration I would like to add which will shed light on the make-up of the Future Breed. It is conceivable in future war that the Corps will supply assault units to be transported to their battle area aboard large transport submarines. The utilization of submarines as attack or assault transports will determine to some extent the temperamental characteristics of the troops to be used. They will, in other words, be "picked crews." As an interesting commentary to the above, we may refer to the famous crossing of the atomic submarine Nautilus under the North Pole. A London observer who interviewed her crew in England was quoted in part as follows:

"They seemed to be a group of men less likely than any other group in the world to get on each other's nerves, panic in fear, crack under pressure, or let each other down. They are all smoothly sanded round pegs in round holes . . . the only thing they seem to lack is imagination. . . . This kind of crew doesn't come in colorful packages."

Thus we may have to settle for a less colorful character in our Future Breed than the one we're used to seeing, stepping smartly up Broadway Pier from the liberty boat, or jumping off the bus from Lejeune, but our Corps must train its men for the times, and not for the dramatics. And we must not forget that although an efficient classification system can give the man his job, only tradition and custom under an enlightened leadership can give that man the inspiration to give that job all of his head and his heart. This done, we can always rest assured when we hear the name, "Marine!" USMC

THE LONELIEST MAN IN THE MILITARY

By LtCol C. F. Austin, USA



Reprinted from ARMED FORCES MANAGEMENT: Mar '59. The author is an instructor at the US Army Management School, Ft. Belvoir, Va. All Marines are encouraged to submit new ideas officially to the Marine Corps Landing Force Development Center, MCS, Quantico. (MCO 3900.2A, para 17 applies.) The GAZETTE, too, welcomes new ideas in article or letter form. Our mission: to print your ideas.

"THE LONELIEST MAN IN THE military is the man with a new idea."

If we examine this statement objectively, there is ample reason to believe that it is all too true.

We talk of management tools today. The most neglected and improperly used management tool, in my opinion, is the suggestion program.

It is a fact of life that the best ideas don't reach fruition through command channels. The very nature of our military relationship actively works against radically new ideas, believe it or not. A case in point: Tomorrow morning your immediate subordinate may come to you with a new idea—a radically new idea. If you are typical (and you are, whether you want to be or not) you will either pour cold water on it or "damn it with faint praise."

Your subordinate with the new idea has only two alternatives. One, he can take the idea up with you again, and risk your ire by appearing to disagree with your prior "judgment." If he does this you will probably set him straight in no uncertain terms—and that will be the last new idea you ever hear about from him. Two, your subordinate can put his idea on paper and drop it in the nearest suggestion box. The suggestion will then be forwarded to you for evaluation, since it pertains to your organization. You are filled with consternation when you realize that your subordinate has bypassed you, and you become even more concerned when you remember that you have already expressed an opinion to him on the idea.

You realize you must reprimand him, for his own good, which you do very earnestly. You may even order him to prepare the endorsement recommending non-adoption of the suggestion. This is real poetic justice, and the second alternative available to your subordinate will have the same result: it will be the last new idea he attempts to sell while he is with your organization, or perhaps with any other.

Another thing which will kill a new idea—and prevent future ones from even being submitted—is inept and subjective suggestion evaluation. It seems to be a fact of life that people resent suggestions for improvement in their own organizations because they regard them as criticisms of existing situations, for which they feel at least in part responsible, or guilty. Let's take a couple of horrible examples.

At one large military post, a suggestion was submitted that employees in post exchanges wear nameplates, enabling customers to perform the common (and very desirable) courtesy of addressing them by name. The suggestion was rejected for the ridiculous reason that such an action "would cause overfamiliarity with employees."

A suggestion that a drinking fountain be installed near a tennis court was rejected because "The suggestion has been given serious consideration and it has been decided that if a drinking fountain were installed a latrine would also have to be installed and a latrine by a tennis court would be undesirable."

The disgusted suggestor was then counselled by his wife to resubmit the suggestion with the obvious solution: That the drinking fountain be installed *without* the latrine, and that a sign be placed over the fountain reading, "For Intake Only!"

Both the nameplate and drinking fountain suggestions went through the complete evaluation process and were rejected by the suggestion committee, as indicated in minutes signed by the chairman!

Fortunately the suggestor of the "nameplate" idea had a temper. He promptly put the same suggestion on a fresh suggestion form and mailed it direct, marked "personal" to Major General H. C. Parks, Director of the Army and Air Force Exchange Service. The suggestion received careful appraisal and was adopted for all exchanges in the Army and Air Force (at the discretion of major commanders). I'm afraid, however, that this is the exception rather than the rule.

What can be done to lower the mortality rate of new ideas in the military? It is a most difficult question, but I may have a partial solution.

One way is to improve the suggestion program, which is easier said than done. I recently interviewed an installation commander who inherited a dead suggestion program and in a short period of time converted it into such a dynamically successful program that it was given department-wide publicity. Based on his experience, my own two years experience as chairman of an installation incentive awards committee,

and interviews with other personnel involved with successful suggestion programs, I have come up with some criteria which may help installation commanders evaluate and improve their own suggestion programs:

1. *Put "top management" on the suggestion committee.* Since service on the committee is an "additional duty," it is easily sloughed off by missing meetings and/or sending a section representative who is considerably less than inspired by being "volunteered" for something when he has a full "in" basket. The general staff in the Army (G1, G2, G3, G4 and Comptroller), and comparable individuals in the other services should all be members, by name and not by position.

2. *Don't delegate the power to disapprove a suggestion any lower than the power to approve one.* There is no more important criterion than this, and probably none that is violated more often. My best example of the observance of this rule is a Major General, chief of staff of a major command, who reserves to himself the right to disapprove, as well as to approve suggestions. I contend that he has insured careful and objective suggestion evaluation, even if he doesn't even read the disapproval he signs.

3. *The program must have the commander's personal support,* and this doesn't mean lip service. It must be a fact, and it must be common knowledge among all personnel in the command. An action often regarded as lip service is the presentation of awards in the commander's office, rather than in the office of the suggestor and in the presence of his superiors, peers and subordinates. The latter approach is worth dozens of times the value of the former, if it is done sincerely. And it doesn't take any more of the commander's time if it is carefully planned.

4. *Suggestions must be processed rapidly.* Nothing will discourage an enthusiastic suggestor sooner than to have to wait months to get results on his suggestion. I know of a post where the suggestion has been sarcastically made that effort be made to process suggestions sometime during the present tour of military personnel submitting suggestions.

5. *The integrity of the program must be carefully guarded.* This sounds obvious, but it is difficult. In fact, it takes a lot of courage to administer a truly objective and honest program. Reversing a subjective initial evaluation by an organizational element requires knowledge and ability. One aid in doing this is to call upon the services of the management assistance group (sometimes called management engineers) usually located in the Comptroller's Office. Another pitfall is the old (and despicable) practice of recommending disapproval of a suggestion, making it stick and then putting the suggestion into effect. This must be watched carefully, for it will give the program a dishonest reputation.

6. *When in doubt, adopt.* The net result of adopting borderline suggestions will be beneficial. A truism of suggestion programs is that the benefits from the programs vary in direct proportion to the number of suggestions submitted. This, plus the additional fact that a well-administered suggestion program will generate increased participation, makes it incumbent upon the commander that suggestors receive the benefit of any doubt.

There are other criteria for a good suggestion program, but if a commander can insure these six, I feel he can be reasonably sure he has a good suggestion program. The task of measuring his program against these criteria is not easy, and he must do it very carefully, enlisting objective aid when necessary.

I'd like to add this statement of fact: The best ideas in existence at your installation have not been adopted. They probably haven't even been put in writing!

I regret to state, however, that a good suggestion program is only a partial solution to the problems described in the first of this article. What can be done to create a climate in a military organization which encourages offering and support of new ideas (especially *radically* new ideas)?

This question is as difficult as any command, management or leadership problem facing a military commander today. I don't know anyone who has a completely good answer to it. Let's explore it a little.

We are talking about an organizational climate where individuals feel motivated to think creatively, and where they and their superiors feel motivated to actively and vigorously push and sponsor a new idea until it is either adopted or proven to be not useful beyond any reasonable doubt. This would be a wonderful atmosphere—one in which we all would like to serve, but in which few have served. As stated earlier, the very nature of military relationships works against this atmosphere.

The single concept of "You must go through channels," ever present at all levels in the military, is perhaps the greatest single barrier to effectiveness and efficiency of management that was ever self-inflicted by man. I don't see how we will ever have the desired atmosphere until the concept of that false and artificial barrier is exploded for the myth that it is. I make no attempt to assess the value of "channels" in combat or tactical operations, but I think someone should.

In the meantime, if you would like to have a couple of questions for sampling the atmosphere in your present organization, ask this one of anyone in it. "Do you feel free to propose a new idea regardless of the subject, to a supervisor two, three or four echelons above you without taking it up first with your immediate and intervening supervisors?"

Ask the next one of higher level supervisors: "Do you encourage lower level supervisors or employees to communicate new ideas directly to you, by-passing intervening supervisors?"

Obviously, the answer you will get is, "No, of course not, I'm in the military. Haven't you ever heard of military channels?"

Here's another question that will bother you. An eminent university professor after much research has determined that over half of all good ideas that reach fruition are turned down six times before they are adopted. The question that you can't possibly answer with an honest "yes" is: Do the military personnel in your organization feel free to press on with an idea through six successive rejections?

There is a one-in-a-million chance that there is such an organization in the military. If yours is such please let me know. I'd like very much to research it. USMC

PASSING IN REVIEW


THE WAR MEMOIRS OF CHARLES DE GAULLE: Unity, 1942-1944

CHARLES DE GAULLE, 378 pages. Simon and Schuster, N. Y. $6.00

This second volume of Gen de Gaulle's war memoirs is a personal account of his struggle to extend his leadership from that of a small group of Free French to that of all French nationals and territories joined in the desire to cooperate with the Allies against the common enemies. In accomplishing this tremendous task, de Gaulle states that his objectives were: "To reinstate France as a belligerent, to prevent her subversion, to restore a destiny that depended on herself alone."

Unlike other countries such as Poland and Norway who, when overrun by Hitler's Wehrmacht, sent their governments into exile, the government of the French Third Republic did not leave France. When Paris fell, the government moved to Vichy, where it continued to exercise its functions albeit with German restrictions. For de Gaulle, sentenced to death in absentia by Vichy and working against formidable odds in London to create an effective French resistance, the existence of the Petain Government made it most difficult for him to gain acceptance as the legal representative of all French lands and peoples willing to continue to fight. Only through a legally recognized government did de Gaulle believe that France would be able to ensure that its continuing participation on the Allied side would entitle it to a significant postwar role and would ensure the integrity of its overseas territories. Thus for him the problem was to create and gain recognition for a new French government when there already existed a French government in France. That this government functioned under German control was unfortunate, but Vichy did in effect have authority over Unoccupied France and most of its overseas possessions.

The US and Great Britain were most desirous of seeing France reenter the war, but, faced with what apparently was a duality of French leadership, they were hesitant to fully endorse de Gaulle as the head of a new French government when



Ecole Militaire, Paris

Vichy continued to evidence some capabilities of exercising the functions of a state. The Russians, while not as intimately involved in the problem as were the Americans and British, were nevertheless quite interested in de Gaulle's resistance movement. Communists in France were busily engaged in fighting the Germans and at the same time ensuring that their influence and control over what remained of French political life would grow ever stronger. The Russians were thus somewhat readier than were the other allies to support de Gaulle in his moves to extend his control over the French people. De Gaulle, on his part, makes plain in his memoirs his fear of communist domination of the Resistance, and the threat that this possibility posed for the democratic institutions he visualized for postwar France.

The Allied invasion of North Africa brought matters to a head. De Gaulle was determined that France would re-enter the conflict alongside its Allies. But he insisted, as he had all along, that this could only be done under a French government and not under any other arrangement regardless of how temporary that might be. Obviously, for de Gaulle, the Vichy Government could not function in such a role since he in fact could not accept its existence. The Americans and British, landing in French territory, assumed with certain realism that they would have to have some dealings with the representatives of the Vichy Government then serving in North Africa. Thus the political situation in North Africa was confused. Darlan was the representative of Vichy; de Gaulle was the aggressive symbol and the dominant element of the French resistance; Giraud, a newcomer, stood by, ready and willing to accept command of the new French forces being created under overall Allied direction. Darlan's assassination settled one facet of the problem; but the subordination of Giraud to de Gaulle and the eventual establishment of a representative French government were not so easily attained.

The story of de Gaulle's final triumph over all opposition and his entry into Paris with the 2d French Armored Division as the recognized leader of Fighting France and its government is evidence of the determination and tenacity of this powerful world figure. De Gaulle had wanted to blot out the shame of Vichy and return France to the Grand Alliance as a full partner entitled by its efforts and sacrifices to a major role after the war. In this mission he succeeded to a significant degree.

This volume of memoirs was first published in France in 1956, before de Gaulle was again to come forth as the leader of France's destiny in times of trouble. Today, as President of the Fifth Republic, Charles de Gaulle retains the same qualities of purpose and determination he exhibited during WWII to maintain France as a great world power. His recent concern with the jurisdiction of NATO over French naval forces; his refusal to allow nuclear munitions to be stored in France unless under French control; his efforts to participate more fully in Anglo-American activities: these are all

manifestations of his intense nationalism.

Today, France is, to a significant degree, de Gaulle. And, although its territories have been reduced, its culture, its economy, its assets, and its influence in world affairs cannot be minimized. Thus to understand something of what motivates France today there is a need to discover what motivates its leader. There is no question that the *War Memoirs of Charles de Gaulle, Unity, 1942-1944*, is a volume to be read. Not only does this book provide material of considerable importance to an understanding of the events and personalities which influenced recent French history, but perhaps of more significance, it provides an insight into the mind of de Gaulle. His intervention once changed a defeated and disoriented nation into a vital and important member of the Free World community; the fate of the Fifth Republic is yet to be determined, but its destiny lies largely in the hands of its first president, Charles de Gaulle.

Reviewed by Col V. J. Croizat

Ed: A frequent *Gazette* contributor, Col Croizat has attended the French War College.

CHANNEL DASH

TERENCE ROBERTSON. Illustrated. E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., N.Y. $4.00

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
Reviewed by LtCol R. N. Grant, RM

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HANNIBAL: One Man Against Rome

Harold Lamb. 310 pages. Doubleday and Company, Inc., N. Y. $4.50

Students of the science of war and of history are familiar with Hannibal's great battles, particularly Cannae and Lake Trasimeno, and with his tactics and achievements. But little has been told about the man himself. This master of war, 'til now a great name—but a shadowy figure—in this story is brought into focus.

Here is the portrait of a man who could change a plan almost in midstride, invent a course of action that no one could predict, form an alliance and place an economic squeeze on an enemy capital. He was a man who could hide an army above a mist through which the enemy marched unsuspectingly onto an open plain and into a death trap.

In describing all of this, Harold Lamb deals with the man and his times, not the details of battles and equipment. The result is another interesting and informative story by the author who, in previous biographies, has brought vividly to life Genghis Khan, Alexander the Great, Suleiman the Magnificent, and Ivan the Terrible. Additionally, this book pictures the history and civilization of Carthage and gives us a look at Scipio Africanus, the Roman general who learned his tactics from studying Hannibal and then, when Hannibal's resources were gone, used these same tactics to defeat the master.

. . . The story of one—if not the greatest—of the "Great Captains."

Hannibal is, for those who like history, a great experience from the first glimpse of this terrible antagonist of the Senate and the Roman people to the final hunt which ended only when Hannibal decided, "It is time now to end the great anxiety of the Romans who have grown weary of waiting for the death of a hated old man."

No blazing tale of carnage and sex, but a highly readable account of a great leader and a period of great historical significance.

Reviewed by LtCol L. A. Gilson

THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF POLAND

M. K. DZIEWANOWSKI. 368 pages, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1959. $7.50

From reading this book one frightening impression remains: the hold which Marx-Leninism has on its adherents, a hold which not even the brutality and depravity of communist practice seems able to shake. This shows most clearly in the case of the present-day leader of Polish communism, Wladislaw Gomulka. He was a party member—an insignificant one, otherwise he would not live today—at the time of the Great Purge of the late Thirties.


The communist party was proscribed in Poland then and many of its leaders had taken refuge in the Soviet Union. Stalin slew them all, and with them as many others as he could lure into the USSR. Having done that, he dissolved the Polish communist party sometime in 1938. By then he had decided on a deal with Hitler. The Polish communists had thus become as much of an embarrassment to him as the German communists in Nazi concentration camps.

During the war, Gomulka witnessed the harshness of the Soviet occupation regime in Eastern Poland; knew who were the perpetrators of the Katyn murders; must have been sickened by the callousness with which the Soviets looked on while Warsaw was turned into rubble and 200,000 Poles died during the heroic uprising of 1944. After having been the principal builder of a communist Poland, he found himself contemptuously discarded, subjected to all kinds of chicanery and threats, held in house arrest for more than five years. Yet he emerged in 1956 with the resolve to save Polish communism by making it acceptable to his countrymen. From what we know, Gomulka is, after all his bitter experiences, a convinced Marxist.

The practical value of books such as *The Communist Party of Poland* lies in the fact that they give us an objective view of the tremendous strength, but also of the weaknesses, of world communism. Much better than the usual anti-communist rantings, they show us the sort of antagonists the free world faces.

Reviewed by WCdr J. Gellner, RCAF

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OBSERVATION POST

Take Time For Shooters

MCRD, SAN DIEGO, CALIF.—Is the average Marine a poor shot? To put it bluntly—yes. In fact, taking all into consideration, he's probably worse than that.

To prove this point let's take a look at the record. Since the only record available is annual requalification, let's analyze it. I estimate at least ten per cent of the Corps is unqualified. For all practical purposes, this ten per cent is out of action. Ninety per cent are qualified and 90 per cent is a good qualification until you start to dig a little further. Consider the *Marksman*. Just how good do you have to be to count in that 90 per cent? Well, for one thing, you definitely don't have to hit the "enemy"—in this case, just a bull's-eye.

You can go so far as to stray out into the three ring 10 times. You still make out and the only conclusion I can draw from this is that "qualifying" just isn't too qualified. Also, keep in mind that all this shooting is done under ideal conditions. The man slept in a clean bed the night before, had a good breakfast, went out to a good firing point, knew the exact range, fired at a black and white target that wasn't moving or shooting back and, in general, was firing under ideal conditions.

Put this same man in a combat situation and you can imagine what the percentage of qualification is then. Probably not all *Experts* qualify under combat conditions. For those who would like to look further into this matter of marksmanship I suggest *Men Against Fire* by BGen S. L. A. Marshall. He found that only about 25 per cent of the people in the best units on the front lines ever fire at a target.

What can we do to improve the situation, especially in our combat units? For one thing, we must emphasize the individual, not just getting this or that qualification. Every single Marine in our front line units should be capable of getting hits consistently at ranges up to 300



yards. He should be able to get hits at 500 or more yards. The biggest crime we can commit—and I do mean crime—is to put an unqualified Marine on the front lines.

It's just like taking an unqualified pilot and telling him to fly. We wouldn't think of doing that, but we don't hesitate a minute to give an unqualified rifleman an infantryman's billet. Right now all we do for the unqualified man is say, "Better luck next time" or "See you next year." We can't wait a year. I say, let's get him back on the range and keep him there 'til he *does* qualify. This takes time and money but we can't afford to send an unqualified man to war.

Let's give the man a break. Let's give the Marine Corps a break. Let's quit kidding ourselves all we have to do is put a man on the front lines and the rest takes care of itself. It isn't that simple. Ignoring the problem only makes it worse.

In the past there was *Expert* and *Sharpshooter* pay. This helped. This extra pay was more than enough to make everyone go out and work on his own. Promotion also partly depended on a man's rifle score. Today the unqualified rifleman is promoted right along with everyone else. Marksmanship is the basic skill of every infantryman; how an unqualified man can be promoted is a mystery to me.

Competitive and recreational shooting is a fine means—not only of developing shooters—but, more i m p o r t a n t, of producing good coaches and instructors. The Marine Corps Competition-in-Arms program each year turns out plenty of shooters ready and willing to coach. Turn your weak sisters over to a few of these outstanding shots and you will be amazed at the results they can produce.

To sum up, many Marines now think we have 175,000 top-notch riflemen in the Corps. Unfortunately, this ain't so. On the average we are better than other military forces, but the standard just isn't high enough for us to sit back on our callouses (unless shooting). In other words, we still can improve. We can give added instruction to those who need it. We can create incentive for a man to go out on his own and try to develop his ability, such as added pay. We can surely wed marksmanship to promotion.

The best tacticians in the world, the best weapons, and the best ammo do us absolutely no good if the rifleman on the front line can't get that final kill.

On the other hand, even tactical blunders can be turned into victories if the infantrymen are as good as we can make them. We have the potential to turn out good riflemen. Let's do it, and do it starting now.

Maj H. J. Witkowski

Ed: Maj Witkowski was OiC of the Marine Corps Rifle and Pistol Teams which just concluded competition in the National Matches at Camp Perry, Ohio.

★

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BASIC TRAINING FOR THE INDIVIDUAL

Let's Standardize

MCAS, CHERRY POINT, N. C.—Why do we hear the question, "What should I study for my GMST?"

Do people know what is expected of them?

To answer this ask yourself if you could sit down and list all the items the Marine Corps expects you to know. Then consider the plight of the training officer who must produce a calculated estimate of material to be covered. The cry is immediately heard: "Why do you think MCO 1510.2A was written and page seven of the SRB established?" Neither tells a man when he is qualified by Marine Corps standards, and his rank, to command a unit in combat. They do list nearly 3,000 pages of reference material for the SNCO to know. How does this compare with the requirements of his technical field? "The GMST establishes a man's ability to do the job required," is heard from another quarter. This too is in error because cutting scores vary depending upon personnel requirements and not on what the Marine Corps expects the individual to know. There is room for improvement.

Any system of individual training should accomplish the following: 1) Prevent duplication, 2) Insure complete coverage of subject, 3) Be capable of being accurately recorded, 4) Allow a unit commander to evaluate his unit's training program on a Marine Corps-wide basis without the assistance of an IG inspection, 5) Take minimum time to prepare, 6) Be easily accessible to all individuals, 7) Be economical in materials and manpower, 8) Provide a commander with an accurate appraisal of a man's training status, 9) Be capable of being taught satisfactorily by the average Marine, 10) Inform each individual exactly what the Marine Corps expects of him, 11) Provide documentary proof of adequate training.

To accomplish this the following system is recommended:

Publish each military subject to be covered, either as a special manual or as a section in a larger manual. Each subject would be divided, when appropriate, into nine chapters corresponding with the nine enlisted pay grades. This would help in assigning subject material for each rank to study. Each chapter is then broken down into lessons, varying in number depending upon the scope of the subject, containing sufficient material to be covered adequately in a one or two-hour period of instruction.

Under such a system a page seven could reveal the exact status of a man's training by listing the lessons covered, regardless of transfers.

To maintain a Corps-wide proficiency level a re-cycle period would be assigned to each subject. This can be a year, 18 months, or two years before we return to the beginning and start over.

Such a system would do away with the need for all enlisted extension courses. It would provide MCI a dividing line for general and technical military material, particularly in the 0300 field. Of what importance is the chamber pressure of the M1 rifle to the jet mechanic? All the material referenced in FM23-5 is not of general military knowledge nature, but it is still used as a reference for GMST training. By writing its own reference material the Marine Corps could definitely separate need-to-know information from that of a specialty nature. The man-hour requirements for maintaining changes in the various training library publications would be greatly reduced. It is believed that the overall cost of writing, publishing and distribution would be well under that presently used to maintain the large number of various publications in use. This cost factor doesn't include great savings in man-hours resulting from



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


more efficient and concise training of each individual.

As was stated earlier, a training system should provide a commander a method of knowing the overall status of preparedness in his unit without an IG inspection revealing the results. Headquarters could have tests available upon request, on either a quarterly or semi-annual basis. Unit commanders could use these to test their own commands for inspection or promotional purposes, with Headquarters promulgating the comparative results of each examination. Each question would be referenced by section, chapter and lesson so that any weak areas could be caught and additional emphasis placed upon it during training periods which follow.

Individual requirements could be easily changed by simply moving lessons from one chapter to another. Changes could be incorporated as pen and ink changes, replacement of lessons, chapters or sections. The Marine Rifle Squad does not show any clear division of where the corporal's duties end and the sergeant's begin. In the section on tactics, chapters four and five would be the dividing point. The corporal would know exactly what to study to qualify himself for the rank of sergeant. Further, an individual on detached duty could study the material on his own and request examinations for each subject covered. If a satisfactory mark is achieved, he could be given credit on page seven. In this way, regardless of duty assignment, every man can continue his training in a satisfactory manner.

Capt D. R. Navorska



Let's Specialize

MCB, 29 PALMS, CALIF.—Be it Wednesday afternoon, Saturday morning or any other period designated by the Skipper, every outfit from Co "A," HQMC to the Guard Company, Marine Barracks, Yokosuka, holds individual basic military training sessions at least once a week.

Some hold it more often, others less, depending upon the mission of the organization, but you can bet your old Staff Club chits that every Marine in the Corps receives his ration of Individual Training during the year.

Is this Corps-wide effort in the right direction? Or is it a misdirected effort?

Every Marine receives his basic indoctrination in Boot Camp. Upon graduation, he is theoretically equipped with the fundamentals of an education to be continued through practical application, basic military training, or both.

The infantry Marine continues full force into the mystery of military science. That is his specialty. His job is as technical as any in the Marine Corps, depending upon his rank and position.

But what about the non-infantry Marine—the Leatherneck destined to be with the support elements? How is he to continue his Basic Military Training?

That's right—by virtue of the weekly training session.

MCO 1510.2A outlines the Individual Training program throughout the Marine Corps. This edict recommends what subjects are to be taught to what ranks and when. Training officers and NCO's schedule their local sessions based on what

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Headquarters directs. But again, is this the answer to Corps-wide Basic Military Training? Does this program effectively continue every Marine's education in military science?

The average Marine cannot absorb completely all the "general" subjects, evaluate them and store them for future use. There is one good reason: They are "general" subjects. They are designed to apply to every man in the Marine Corps, regardless of type of duty, MOS or motivation.

Individual Training in the Marine Corps is the basis of our discipline. Without it we would be a mob of disorganized technicians. By improving our training we can improve on the high military proficiency for which the Marine Corps is famous.

Individual Training is designed as basic military science. It has to be "basic" in that it must apply to 175,000 individuals. Why not cut down on the "general" aspect and be more specific? Let's look at the needs of the Marine's duty assignment.

Assume that we have two identical sergeants to train. One, Sergeant Infantry, can represent the mobile phase of the Marine Corps. The other, Sergeant Technical, will represent the semi-permanent Marine who is literally tied down with the gear in the rear.



Both are exposed to the same Basic Military Training. Each receives the same number of hours on Military Sanitation and Personal Hygiene. But do both Marines apply their knowledge in the same direction?

Sergeant Infantry, mobile soul that he is, spends most of his time in the field, living off his back. Sergeant Technical, on the other hand, might well be standing a scope watch in a radar van, off the end of an airfield. Will both apply their training in the same degree and manner? Hardly!

Sergeant Infantry, equipped with up to 60 pounds of gear and equipment, is more likely to be interested in how to keep those number 9½EE feet in shape than Sergeant Technical, whose main worry concerns premature middle age spread.

Conversely, our technical, nonmobile friend is more interested in how to build and maintain a six-holer while Sergeant Infantry can do right well with his entrenching tool.

Why not break down this Sanitation and Hygiene course, after the basic resumé and assist our sergeants with the information that they need, when they need it?

Now before anyone runs to the armory and breaks out a BAR in indignation and defense of his own training system, let's look at a "typical system."

Soon after the troops recover from New Year's Eve, the training NCO breaks out the Annual Proficiency Exams and announces to all and sundry: "You people that can pass this exam can skip classroom training this year."

Guidebooks come out of hiding. Field manuals disappear from the library and the 1stSoldier hides his one copy of the LPM. For one week, it is a sight that would gladden the IG's heart. Every Marine in camp (even the brown-bagger) bones up on Marine Corps lore.

Testing day comes and goes and all the study material disappears back into dusty corners and shelves to wait for another test. Some pass the exam but not many. The others settle down to the same routine training that they have experienced every year that they have been in the Corps.

Why not give all hands a break? Vary the training to suit the need of the command. The student gets a change of material and a challenge to learn something he can use. The instructor has the opportunity to present his lecture or practical demonstration in a new manner. Both improve—both add to their proficiency with the addition of

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
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knowledge that they need and can use. When this happens, the Marine Corps is bound to benefit.

Our two hypothetical friends, Sergeant Technical and Sergeant Infantry, would each receive and need all the instruction they can get on some subjects. These include close order drill, military courtesy and discipline, history and traditions, and our basic weapons, the US Rifle, caliber 30, M1. But when you move out into the other subjects of Individual Training, you can clearly see where one of our Marine friends would need more emphasis on one aspect of a subject, more than another.

A case in point: Both sergeants are required to study Security of Military Information. When does Sergeant Infantry handle classified matter? Seldom, if at all. Sergeant Technical, on the other hand, is more apt to have several file drawers stuffed with delicate material. After the first general briefing on the subject, which one needs to have additional hours of instruction on the subject?

Another way to look at it would be as follows: Sergeant Technical and Sergeant Infantry are paygrade E-4, however in the field of Security of Military Information, Sergeant Technical might need an E-5 or E-6 amount of knowledge while Sergeant Infantry might need only E-3 knowledge.

But how can we evaluate the individual without breaking down the present GMST setup? We can do it by the use of balanced questions in the same examination. Our Infantry Sergeant might miss a few of the non-mobile questions, but likewise, Sergeant Technical won't be as well versed on the correct commands for pitching shelter halves.

With due respect to our own careers, and the possible careers of the troops we command, let's evaluate the next lecture. Let's do an about-face and try the practical demonstration we have scheduled from a different angle. After three years of giving the same performance, an actor gets stale—so does the play.

The same goes with our Individual Training program in the Marine Corps.

AGySgt Ed Barnum

Prestige: A Reappraisal

HQ FMFLANT, NORFOLK, VA.— Our eyes and ears have been constantly assaulted in the past few years with the recurrent cries, "How can we restore the prestige of the Staff Non-Commissioned Officer?" and "Why aren't the Staff NCOs as good as they used to be?" The clamor has been so continuous and so loudly repeated that all hands have come to hold the mental image of a staff sergeant or higher as a beaten, shiftless, no account bum.

I don't believe it! I think the time has come to examine the problem to determine *if it does in fact exist,* for I am convinced that, with a few exceptions, it does not exist except in our own minds. Unfortunately, like Hitler's oft-repeated lie, the outcry has begun to be believed even by the Staff NCOs, who should know better.

Let us then explore this problem by starting at the beginning. What is PRESTIGE? My dictionary gives several definitions. One, shown as obsolete, is "A conjuror's trick, a sorcery; an illusion; a deception." Then it lists two additional meanings; "2. Power to charm, dazzle or command admiration" and "3. Ascendancy derived from general admiration or esteem; commanding position in men's minds." The listed synonym is "influence." From this might be derived a description that prestige is an awareness of worth shared by the worthy individual and his contemporaries. Prestige is not a shiny stick with a brass ferrule, nor is it a special table in the club. These are prestige under the obsolete definition.

"Ascendancy derived from general admiration or esteem" is the end-product of merit on the part of the individual. The central question is, therefore, to determine if that merit exists today among the Staff NCOs. It is then appropriate at the outset to examine the route an enlisted



man must follow to attain this status, and, further, to consider what he must do to retain it.

First of all he had to be accepted for initial enlistment. After recruit training, he has had to demonstrate proficiency on the job, and in the general and technical tests which are prerequisites to advancement. He has had to qualify for reenlistment at least once before attaining staff grade. His general competence has been under continuing close scrutiny throughout his entire career. Moreover, the mere attainment of staff grade is no assurance of continuity of service in grade to retirement. Reenlistment is a recurring opportunity for screening by commanders. In addition, repeated early release programs and the machinery for administrative reduction are powerful levers for removal of the poor performers.

To state that the mechanisms to ensure excellence in those who attain staff grade is ample verges on redundancy. Turning this thought to a different aspect, to allege wide-spread incompetence among staff non-commissioned officers is, in reality, an indictment of the officer leadership of the Marine Corps, for it is an admission of failure on our part to control adequately the enlisted promotion processes.

Is there a real failure? Certainly the "good old days" are gone, but it is not reasonable to expect them to return. We will continue to use the latest and best weapons and equipment obtainable, and this indicates that the complexity of problems facing all military men will continue to increase. Since this is so, it is not reasonable to expect any single individual officer or enlisted to have maximum proficiency in all fields of military endeavor.

Are our Staff NCOs highly proficient in their individual fields and do they possess a reasonable comprehension of the problems of personnel in other fields? The question really requires no answer for we all know and realize (when we consider) that the answer is affirmative.

Moreover, the history of the last nine years is itself an overwhelming vote of confidence in the competence of this group of Marines. Think back to July of 1950 and remember how first the Brigade and then the 1stMarDiv were brought to strength, and recall the record of performance. The basic element, the individual Marine, of that force came from all over the world. Organizations, posts, stations, and detachments, regular and reserve, contributed men who were integrated into an effective fighting force with no time for unit training. They were effective because they were already trained. But who carried the load of their training? Seasoned officers did some of it; junior officers fresh from Quantico did some of it; experienced Staff NCOs carried their share of the burden. Think also of the Marine Forces in Lebanon who displayed such a high degree of personal competence, and consider who trained these men.

Think also of your own daily conduct as officers. When you deal with an office, be it an infantry company or a branch in a division of HQMC, do you normally accept the information given you by a Staff NCO, or do you feel that you must go to some, or any, officer for verification? My own experience has justified my reliance on the Staff NCO and I believe your answer will be the same.

What of those who are actually poor or substandard performers? The answer should be obvious. There is ample and powerful machinery to force their improvement, or removal, and it is most probable that the majority, the competent Staff NCOs, would enthusiastically endorse a vigorous program to clear out this deadwood. Such action would create promotional opportunities and enhance the stature of those remaining.

What, then, is the beef? We set high standards. We provide screening to ensure that the individual Marines attain and maintain these standards. We know in our hearts that they meet these standards. Has not the time come to call off the dogs? Shouldn't we stop pretending that this important segment of the Marine Corps is made up of bums and that we, as officers, are derelict in our duty for having let them attain their present ranks? Let's give the devil his due before he becomes one in truth and in fact.

Col H. T. Marshall

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
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MAJGEN DAVID M. SHOUP NOMINATED AS 22D COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS

MajGen David M. Shoup has been nominated by President Eisenhower to be the 22d Commandant of the Marine Corps.

Upon Senate approval of the President's nomination, Gen Shoup will succeed Gen R. McC. Pate, whose second two-year appointment expires at the end of this year.

A Marine officer for 33 years, Gen Shoup won the Medal of Honor for heroism at Tarawa. Then a colonel, he commanded the 2d Marines, 2d Marine Division in the assault on Betio Island. The citation awarding him the Nation's highest military award credited Gen Shoup as being largely responsible for the success of the campaign through his "brilliant leadership, daring tactics and selfless devotion to duty."

Since WWII Gen Shoup has served as Chief of Staff, 1st Marine Division; Commanding Officer, Basic School, Marine Corps Schools, Quantico; Fiscal Director of the Marine Corps; Inspector General of the Marine Corps; and Commanding General of the 1st and 3d Marine Divisions. At present he is Commanding General, Marine Corps Recruit Depot, Parris Island.



Entry of General Quitman Into Mexico City is the first of a new series of Clymer-Lovell prints. *The Korean Incident, Belleau Wood* and *Tarawa* will be introduced in other issues. Sets will be available in December.



